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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is comprised of three essays on the economics of education in 
developing countries, focused on the analysis of public financing of schools 
operated by non-state actors.  
 
Chapter One focuses on publicly subsidised private secondary schools in Uganda. 
Student value-added is higher in these schools than in government schools. The 
chapter explores the role of the quality of school management as a mediating 
factor in the performance differential, finding that private schools are on average 
no better managed than government schools, with the exception of those managed 
by an international charity.  
 
Chapter Two evaluates a five-year private school voucher lottery programme in 
Delhi. This lottery was designed as a test of India’s national Right to Education 
Act Section 12(1)(c), which reserves 25 percent of places at private schools 
nationwide for students from “economically weaker sections”, with funding 
coming from government. Students who won the lottery and attended low-cost 
private schools performed slightly worse in Hindi and no different in Maths and 
English, or on various non-cognitive skills.  
 
  
iv 
Chapter Three evaluates a large-scale contracting out of public schools to private 
management in Punjab, Pakistan. Using a difference-in-difference framework, I 
estimate that failing government schools that are contracted out to private 
operators dramatically increase their enrolment, but that the effect on student 
learning is ambiguous.  
 
Overall these three studies highlight the variability in forms of public financing 
for independently operated schools, and the variability in quality. In all three 
policies, financing for non-state schools costs significantly less than equivalent 
spending in government schools. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
There have been rapid increases in the number of children attending school 
around the world, but there remains a global crisis of learning in schools. Of 
around half a billion children attending school worldwide, an estimated 130 
million haven’t learnt basic skills even after attending school for four or more 
years (UNESCO, 2014). Fewer than one in five upper primary school students in 
Sub-Saharan Africa can meet a global minimum standard of proficiency in 
mathematics or reading. The average grade 6 student in New Delhi, India, 
performed at a grade 3 level in Mathematics in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). 
 
A key cause of such weak results has been failures in governance. A basic 
condition for learning to take place is for teachers to be present. A survey of 
seven African countries (Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, 
and Uganda) found that in unannounced visits 44 percent of teachers were absent 
from class (Bold et al., 2017). In one third of classrooms there were students 
present with no teacher. Combining teacher presence estimates with data on how 
lesson time was used when there was a teacher, (Bold et al., 2017) estimate that 
students are actually taught for an average of 2 hours and 46 minutes per day, 
roughly half of the scheduled time.  
 
Alongside such weak results and governance failures in the public school sector, 
there has been an explosion in the low-cost private school sector, particularly in 
middle-income countries. The share of children attending private schools in 
middle-income countries almost doubled from around 10 percent in 2000 to 19 
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percent in 2015.1 In response to this growth in demand for private schools and 
failures in governance in the public sector, many governments have explored ways 
to involve the private sector in the delivery of public schooling. The theory is that 
by increasing accountability for outcomes in exchange for more operational 
autonomy, schools will be able to deliver better results. The nature of teaching 
means local knowledge is necessary, and by providing autonomy on 
implementation (but not on standards or evaluation) to local actors, better 
performance may be able to be achieved (Pritchett, 2013).  
 
In this thesis I evaluate three different policies involving public financing for non-
government operated schools in three different developing countries. Aslam et al. 
(2017) offer a typology of three different types of public-private partnership in 
education; subsidies for private schools, vouchers for children to attend private 
schools, and government schools that are contracted to private operators (dubbed 
contract schools). Subsidies and voucher schemes both involve government 
financing for students to attend existing private schools. The main conceptual 
distinction between these two types is whether the money is targeted at the 
school or the individual student, though in practice in many schemes labelled as 
“voucher” programmes there is no actual physical voucher and financing is 
provided directly to the school. Whilst critics of the privatisation of public schools 
abound, some of these schemes are perhaps actually closer to “public-ising private 
schools”2. The category of “contract schools” includes well-known charter school 
schemes in the United States and academy schools in the United Kingdom. 
 
                                      
1 UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
2 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/punjab-and-sindh-provinces-in-pakistan-are-public-
ising_us_59e474eee4b02e99c5835804 2 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/punjab-and-sindh-provinces-in-pakistan-are-public-
ising_us_59e474eee4b02e99c5835804 
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In Chapter One I focus on government subsidised private schools in Uganda. A 
common perception is that private schools achieve better results than government 
schools through better management practices. I test this theory directly, 
presenting the first internationally benchmarked estimates of school management 
quality from Africa (based on the “World Management Survey”), and how much 
this mediates the effect of school type on student outcomes. I thus contribute to 
literatures on the role of school governance, organization, and management in 
determining student outcomes. I find that student value-added is higher in non-
state schools than in government schools, after controlling for household income. 
Despite this better performance, I find that private schools are on average no 
better managed than government schools (with one exception being those 
managed by an international charity). The overall level and distribution of 
management quality is similar to that found in other non high-income countries 
(India and Brazil). Despite the result that management quality does not explain 
the better performance of non-state schools, I show that overall differences in 
school management quality do matter for student value-added - a standard 
deviation change in management is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation 
change in test scores. 
 
Chapter Two evaluates a five-year private school voucher lottery programme in 
Delhi. This lottery was designed as a test of India’s national Right to Education 
Act Section 12(1)(c), which reserves 25 percent of places at private schools 
nationwide for students from “economically weaker sections”, with funding 
coming from government. Students who won the lottery were provided with 
vouchers to cover the cost of attending a low-cost private school in East Delhi. 
Lottery winners (and students induced to attend a private school) performed 
slightly worse in Hindi and no different in Maths and English, or on various non-
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cognitive skills. By focusing on urban schools, this chapter complements existing 
research on private schools in India that primarily looks at rural areas. It also 
adds to the global evidence base on the quality of low-cost private schools in 
developing countries. We explore three potential explanations for the puzzle of 
why so many parents pay for schools that are in fact no better than government 
schools, finding some support for heterogeneous effects and for asymmetric 
information. 
 
Chapter Three evaluates a large-scale contracting out of public schools to private 
management in Punjab, Pakistan. 4,276 weak government primary schools 
(around 12 percent of the total) were contracted out to private operators in a 
single year.  These schools remain free to students and the private operator 
receives a per-student subsidy equivalent to less than half of per-pupil spending in 
government schools. Using a difference-in-difference framework, I estimate that 
enrolment in converted schools increased by over 60 percent. Converted schools 
see a slight decline in overall average test scores, but we are unable to distinguish 
if this is a compositional effect or a treatment effect. Schools with no increase in 
the number of students sitting the test saw no change in average test scores. This 
is the first study to estimate the effect of a large scale charter-style contracting of 
public schools to non-state providers in a developing country (just four prior 
studies of such programmes have considered either well-identified effects of 
relatively small scale programmes or descriptive analysis of the precursor to this 
large-scale programme in Pakistan).  
 
These three Chapters show some learning gains from some kinds of public—
private partnerships in some contexts, but not all. Together they highlight the 
variability in forms of public financing for independently operated schools, and 
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the variability in quality of those schools. These chapters add to the limited 
global evidence-base on such school reforms, which remains too thin and too 
mixed to be able to draw strong policy conclusions. One important commonality 
is that in all three policies, financing for non-state schools costs significantly less 
than equivalent spending in government schools. This cost differential is driven 
by lower market salaries than civil service salaries for teachers in each of the 
three contexts. In two of the cases the policy was at least successful in cost-
effectively increasing school enrolment, but in none was it an effective solution to 
the learning crisis. Providing schools with autonomy in exchange for 
accountability may be part of the solution, but it probably won’t be sufficient by 
itself, at least on any reasonable time scale.  
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Chapter 1: School Management and Public–Private 
Partnerships in Uganda 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Can the quality of school management explain differences in student test scores? 
School productivity varies substantially both within and between countries, and 
this matters. Theory and evidence suggest that it is the skills and knowledge 
acquired that lead to higher earnings, not just the amount of time spent in school 
(Hanushek 2013; Hanushek et al. 2015).  In this paper I first ask how much the 
quality of school management matters for student outcomes. I then consider 
whether differences in management quality explain differences in the performance 
of government and private schools, and finally look at what factors explain 
variation in management quality. I find that school management quality does 
indeed matter for productivity, as measured by student value-added. However 
there are no differences on average in management quality between government 
and private schools, leaving the private school premium unexplained. An 
important exception is a UK-owned chain of public-private partnership (PPP 
schools), which are substantially better managed than average, and this difference 
in management quality explains their performance advantage. Few other factors 
reliably predict management quality. 
 
This paper is connected to three sets of literature. First, the literature on school 
effectiveness has sought to identify what makes schools more or less productive in 
terms of student learning. The landmark Coleman report highlighted how the 
majority of variation in student achievement is due to family background rather 
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than observable school characteristics (Coleman et al., 1966). Since then hundreds 
of studies have explored the relationships between educational inputs and school 
productivity.  conduct a comprehensive review of studies from developing 
countries between 1990 and 2010 that estimate the effect of school or teacher 
characteristics on student outcomes. They find 79 studies, of which the majority 
find no statistically significant relationship. One more promising avenue has been 
estimating the total effect of individual teachers on learning with value-added 
models. Teachers matter a great deal (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010). Turning to 
interventions designed to improve school quality in developing countries, the most 
successful have focused on pedagogy and governance (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 
2015). This includes studies looking at bundled packages of management support 
(Fryer 2017; Blimpo et al., 2015; Tavares 2015; Lassibille, 2016; (Beasley & 
Huillery, 2017), as well as studies focused on specific sub-components of school 
management, such as monitoring (de Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, & Patrinos, 2015), 
teacher management (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2015; Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 2011; Atherton and Kingdon 2010), and tailoring teaching to the 
right level of individual students (Pritchett and Beatty 2015; Duflo, Dupas, and 
Kremer 2011; Banerjee et al., 2016).  
 
A second set of literature looks at the “New Empirical Economics of 
Management”, demonstrating links between new measures of management 
practices and productivity in a variety of sectors, including manufacturing, retail, 
healthcare, and education (Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, & Reenen, 2014). Better 
managed manufacturing firms have higher levels of sales, sales growth, 
profitability, and a lower chance of exit (Bloom, Sadun, & Reenen, 2012). 
Management quality can explain the productivity gap between US multinationals 
in Europe and non-US multinationals (Bloom, Sadun, et al., 2012). Better 
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managed hospitals have lower mortality rates, and this measure of management 
quality responds positively to competition (Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van 
Reenen, 2016).  In schools there is a positive correlation between measured 
management quality and school average test scores in seven different countries 
(Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2015).  
 
Third, several papers seek to identify the sources of differences in productivity 
between regular government schools and schools given increased autonomy under 
different public-private partnership arrangements, known as Charter schools in 
the US and Academies in the UK ((Dobbie & Fryer, 2013); Angrist, Pathak, and 
Walters 2013; Eyles, Hupkau, and Machin 2016). Whilst these studies do suggest 
that providing operational autonomy to schools can improve performance, this is 
within a context of a broadly functional education system that provides clear 
objectives and accountability for schools. Greater autonomy may not produce the 
same results if schools are not held accountable for their performance. Cross-
country studies looking at changes in the level of school autonomy have found 
that increases in school autonomy lead to better performance in high income 
countries but worse performance in low-income countries (Hanushek et al. 2013; 
Contreras 2015). Whilst “autonomous government schools” seem to be better 
managed than average in OECD countries, there are no comparable estimates 
from developing countries3. 
 
In this paper I provide the first estimates of school management quality from sub-
Saharan Africa using a version of the “World Management Survey”. Schools in 
                                      
3 Bloom et al (2015) do look at private aided schools in India, finding them no better performing 
than regular government schools. This should not be surprising however, as these schools have 
much less autonomy than charter schools or academies. Their teachers are recruited and paid by a 
central government Education Service Commission rather than by the school, and resemble 
regular government schools much more than private schools (Kingdon, 2007).  
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my nationally representative sample of Ugandan secondary schools score on 
average 2.0 points on a one to five scale, placing them above India and slightly 
below Brazil. I then demonstrate that management quality matters for results for 
student performance in high-stakes tests, using a lagged dependent variable 
dynamic OLS value-added framework, controlling for student prior attainment 
and school characteristics. This marks a methodological improvement upon 
previous work that looks at raw correlations between management quality and 
school average test scores. 
 
I find that despite having more autonomy, private schools and PPP schools are 
no better managed than government schools. An exception is a chain of 
international PPP schools (run by the UK education NGO ‘PEAS’) that have a 
strong internal performance management framework with high stakes for head 
teachers. These schools are substantially (more than 1 standard deviation) better 
managed than average, and perform commensurately better in terms of student 
value-added. 
 
Finally, conceiving of management as a technology (Bloom, Sadun, & Van 
Reenen, 2016), I contribute to the literature on technology adoption in developing 
countries, looking at what factors correlate with better management practices. 
Schools with greater autonomy and in geographical areas with a greater supply of 
skilled workers have better management practices, but other headteacher and 
school factors are not correlated with better practice. 
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1.2 The School System in Uganda 
 
Uganda introduced free universal primary schooling in 1997, and free secondary 
schooling in 2007. Enrolment rates have risen accordingly - the net enrolment rate 
at primary level is now above 90 percent, but the primary completion rate is only 
around 54 percent, and the secondary rates are lower; around 23 percent net 
enrolment and 29 percent junior secondary completion (The World Bank, 2013). 
The official age of school entry is six years old (median age currently in the first 
grade is seven years old in 2012 survey data4), and there are seven grades of 
primary school (P1 - P7), followed by four years of lower secondary (S1 - S4) and 
two years of senior secondary (S5 - S6).  
 
The Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB) administers exams at the end 
of the last year of primary school (P7) to pupils in both public and private 
schools (the Primary Leaving Exam or PLE). It is a requirement to pass this 
exam in order to progress to secondary school. Of 627,000 students enrolled in P7 
in 2014, 586,000 (93 percent) registered and sat the PLE, and 517,000 (82 
percent) passed. Students take exams in four subjects; English, Maths, Science, 
and Social Studies. Within each subject a score is given between one and nine, in 
which a score of 1 - 2 is a Distinction, 3 - 6 is a Credit, 7 - 8 is a Pass, and 9 a 
Fail. UNEB reported 909 cases of exam malpractice in 2015 (cheating by 
collusion, external assistance or impersonation), down from 1,344 cases in 2014.  
 
At secondary school, Ordinary level exams – the Uganda Certificate of Education 
(UCE) - are taken after four years in a minimum of eight subjects, and Advanced 
                                      
4 2011-12 Third wave of the Uganda National Panel Survey 
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level exams taken after two further years in three subjects. The UCE comprises 
six mandatory subjects administered in English; these are Mathematics, English 
language, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, and a choice of either Geography, or 
History, or Religious education. The two final optional subjects can include 
cultural subjects (such as Music); technical subjects (such as Carpentry); or other 
subjects such as Accounting, Business and Computer science. As for PLE scores, 
UCE scores are given for each subject between one and nine, where a 1 - 2 is a 
Distinction and a 9 is a Fail.  
 
There are 1,007 government secondary schools and 1,785 private secondary 
schools, of which some from both sector are part of the free Universal Secondary 
Education programme (USE). Government schools have on average nearly twice 
as many students as private schools. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics.  
 
Teacher recruitment is managed centrally for public schools. Schools submit 
vacancies to the Ministry of Education, who then allocate teachers to schools. 
The Ministry of Public Service pays teachers directly into their bank account, 
making it difficult for schools to vary pay according to performance. In the 
private sector teachers are paid substantially lower wages and schools follow their 
own recruitment procedures (Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sport & 
UNESCO - IIEP Pôle de Dakar, 2014). Government teacher starting salaries 
according to the Public Service Pay scale are 511,000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) 
($150 USD) per month. Data is not available for private sector teachers, but 
across all occupations, median monthly wages were 330,000 UGX ($100 USD) in 
the public sector and 99,000 UGX ($30 USD) in the private sector for those in 
paid employment aged 14 - 64 in the 2012/13 National Household Survey 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). 
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Free Universal Secondary Education (USE) Programme 
 
The Universal Secondary Education (USE) programme offers free places at 
registered schools for eligible pupils. Most government schools are registered for 
USE, with the exception of a minority of elite schools that opt out. Due to the 
limited number of government secondary schools when the programme was 
introduced, private schools were also made eligible to register as part of a public-
private partnership (PPP) in sub-counties either in which there were no 
participating public secondary schools, where those government schools were 
over-crowded, or where pupils must travel very long distances to reach the closest 
government school. This policy is borne out in the 2013 EMIS data – 91 percent 
of sub-counties with no free USE government school have a PPP school, 
compared to only 52 percent of sub-counties that do have a free USE government 
school. To qualify, schools must be registered, certified, charge low fees (defined 
as 75,000 UGX ($22 USD) or less), and meet a set of criteria including having 
adequate infrastructure, a board of governors, and sufficient qualified teaching 
staff. Partnering private schools also become eligible to receive other support from 
the government including the provision of textbooks and other teaching materials. 
 
For students to be eligible, they must have a score of 28 or better in their PLE 
exam, corresponding to an average passing grade in each of the four tested 
subjects. In our sample, six percent of students at government USE schools and 
eight percent of students at private USE (PPP) schools had actually failed to 
meet this threshold. The majority of students enrolled are funded through USE.  
 
Government schools are entitled to 41,000 UGX ($12 USD) per term per student 
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(in addition to other transfers to schools including teacher salaries), and PPP 
schools to 47,000 UGX ($14 USD) per term per student, on condition that they 
do not charge any other non-boarding fees. In practice, despite transfers from 
government and fees being prohibited for USE students, parents still report 
substantial fees paid to both government and PPP schools. Median reported 
annual household spending on school fees per child at secondary school was 
360,000 UGX ($107 USD) for PPP schools and 150,000 UGX ($44 USD) at 
government schools (this includes registration fees and contributions to school 
development funds). Similar amounts are spent on books and uniforms in 
government and private schools 
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Table 1.1: Ugandan School Characteristics 
School Type Government 
Elite 
Government 
PPP Private 
International 
PPP 
Total 
Total Pupils (million) 0.56 0.12 0.46 0.5 0.01 1.65 
Schools 
All 947 121 825 1,698 23 3,614 
Sample 75 7 55 56 19 212 
Average 
Pupils 
All 592 1,002 554 294 488 456 
Sample 610 495 506 281 491 482 
Fee Rate 
All 190 975 96 260 209 228 
Sample 194 943 91 289 175 215 
Pass Rate 
All 0.37 0.78 0.38 0.57 0.49 0.47 
Sample 0.38 0.74 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.43 
Repetition 
Rate 
All 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Sample 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Government 
Teachers 
All 19 40 0 0 0 6 
Sample 17 27 0 0 0 7 
Private 
Teachers 
All 9 16 22 21 20 18 
Sample 10 14 21 21 19 17 
Notes: All data is from the 2016 EMIS. Fee rate is in ‘000 Ugandan Shillings. Pass rate is the proportion 
of UCE candidates who achieve a Division I-III
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Rollout of the USE programme amongst private schools was randomised, allowing 
for a high-quality estimate of the impact on private schools of accessing this 
public funding. Private schools that obtained public USE funding experienced 
greater enrolment growth, improved student performance (on low-stakes tests), 
but also more selection of better performing students at entrance. Despite the 
official eligibility requirements, there was no effect of USE registration on school 
governance arrangements (Barrera-Osorio, Galbert, Habyarimana, & Sabarwal, 
2016).   
 
1.3 Data 
 
I compile data from our own 2016 management survey, with school characteristics 
taken from the 2015 Ark School Survey, official test score data for 2015 from the 
Uganda Examinations Board (UNEB), and further contextual data on schools 
from the 2013 Education Management Information System (EMIS), and the 
national population census in 2014 and 2002. Table 1.2 shows a summary of test 
scores and management scores by school type. 
 
Management Survey 
 
I measure school management quality using an adapted version of the Bloom et al 
(2015) and Lemos & Scur (2016) school management surveys5. Open-ended 
interviews are carried out, with responses scored against a descriptive rubric on a 
one - five scale for 20 question topics. These topics are grouped into four main 
                                      
5 Full details of changes made to the instrument are included in Appendix Al.3.  
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areas; target-setting, monitoring, operations (planning and leading teaching), and 
people (teacher) management.  
 
- Operations (planning and leading teaching): this covers the leadership of 
teaching in a school, the use of differentiated teaching for a range of students, 
how schools use data and assessment to guide practice, and how education best-
practices are adapted;  
- Monitoring: this includes how the school tracks and monitors performance; 
whether there are systems and processes in place to identify and fix problems; 
and how stakeholders are involved in on-going quality improvement (students, 
teachers, community);  
- Target setting: this includes how school targets are linked to student 
outcomes; specific targets for departments and teachers, how appropriate the 
targets are;  
- People: how teachers are recruited, managed, supported and retained.  
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Table 1.2: School Characteristics (Survey Sample) 
 Gov Elite Gov PPP Private IPPP All N 
        
Number of Schools 82 7 62 48 24 223 223 
Management Score  2.0 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.0 2.1 223 
     Operations 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.0 3.3 2.1 223 
     Monitoring 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.0 2.1 223 
     Target-Setting 1.7 2.4 1.8 1.6 2.7 1.8 223 
     People 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 3.1 2.2 223 
Test Scores & Students        
     Value-Added (z-score) 0 0.59 0.07 0.24 0.28   
     Mean Test (UCE z-score) 0 1.21 -0.05 0.38 0.21   
     Mean Students (2015) 563 552 427 281 510 458 223 
     SES Index (z-score) -0.39 1.46 -0.07 0.26 -0.37 -0.09 210 
     Dropout Rate (S3-UCE, %) 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.34 0.21 205 
School Characteristics        
    Total Fees* (UGX) 72 109 79 114 107 88 223 
     % Religious 0.66 0.86 0.60 0.46 0.00 0.53 223 
     % Rural 0.83 0.57 0.55 0.48 1.00 0.69 223 
     Km to Kampala 211 180 193 167 192 193 223 
     % Heads with postgrad 0.39 1.00 0.18 0.13 . 0.25 223 
     Head Experience (Years) 10 19 9 7 . 9 197 
     Teacher Experience (Years) 7 10 6 6 . 7 199 
     Teacher Salary / Month ($) 107 - - 101 98 - 55 
Autonomy        
     Admissions 0.71 0.86 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.86 211 
     Staff 0.69 0.50 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.86 223 
     Academic 0.45 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.54 208 
     All (Mean) 0.62 0.67 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.75 223 
School Market        
     Schools per capita** 1.4 2.4 1.7 1.9 0.8 1.6 214 
     School Age (years) 27 44 16 11 3 18 216 
     Distance to NTC (mean Km) 98 112 84 88 94 92 223 
     2002 Child Literacy Rate** 0.45 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 199 
Notes: Management scores and school autonomy scores are from the WMS-style management 
survey. Test scores are normalised so government schools are equal to zero and other school types 
are shown as the unconditional difference in standard deviations. Test score data comes from 
UNEB for 2016 and 2015 and the Ark School Survey for 2014. School characteristics are from the 
Ark School Survey. School Market variables are from the EMIS, census, and Ark School Survey. 
Both final exam scores and value-added scores are first standardised at the individual student 
level by year, before taking means across all students in each school type. Data on teacher salary 
comes from EPRC 2016.  
* Total fees comprise tuition fees plus fees for extra classes, uniforms, lunch, & ‘other’.   
** These school market variables are presented at the sub-county level 
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Table 1.3: Management quality by school type 
  
Schools 
Management 
(Mean) 
Management 
(SD) 
School type    
 Government (USE) 82 2.0 0.32 
 Elite Government (Not USE) 7 2.4 0.24 
 PPP (Private USE) 62 2.0 0.34 
 Private (Not USE) 48 1.9 0.32 
 International PPP (USE) 19 3.1 0.59 
Location    
         Kampala 4 2.24 0.31 
         Other Urban 22 2.10 0.34 
         Rural 173 1.95 0.33 
Religious Orientation    
 Not religious 95 2.2 0.62 
 Anglican/Protestant 61 1.9 0.32 
 Catholic 47 2.0 0.35 
 Other 11 1.9 0.34 
Academic Selection    
 No Selection 11 2.0 0.66 
 Academic Selection 204 2.1 0.48 
Profit    
 Not for Profit 163 2.1 0.52 
 For Profit 50 2.0 0.35 
Headteacher qualifications    
 Postgraduate 56 2.0 0.37 
 Graduate/ Bachelor’s degree 142 2.0 0.32 
Headteacher employment    
 No other job 187 2.1 0.51 
 HT has 2nd job 28 1.8 0.22 
Notes: This table shows average management quality score for different school types.  
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Each of the 20 scores depends on a series of individual questions that help build 
up an overall description of the concept being measured. This approach combines 
a rich open-ended discussion of management practices allowing for probing and 
clarification where necessary, with a quantitative framework to allow for 
comparison between schools. Scoring inevitably still depends on a subjective 
judgment by individual interviewers, and so substantial time needs to be taken in 
training enumerators, discussing in detail the level descriptors, and calibrating 
scores across interviewers across a range of practice interviews.6 
 
The management survey was carried out with a stratified random sample of 199 
schools from the 2015 Ark School Survey, plus the 19 international public-private 
partnership schools. The sample includes 82 regular government schools, seven 
elite government schools (not part of the free secondary education programme, 
high fee-charging, high socioeconomic status students), 62 public-private 
partnership (PPP) schools, and 48 fully private schools. 
 
The survey was carried out in January 2016 by telephone from a call centre in 
Kampala, from a nationally representative sample of 305 schools (stratified by 
ownership and district), from which an overall response rate of 65 percent was 
obtained (199 schools). A list of school leader phone numbers were provided by 
the Ministry of Education. 29 percent of these numbers failed to connect or were 
not answered. Only six percent refused to participate in the survey. This response 
rate is substantially higher than that found in other countries, from a high of 58 
percent in Brazil to just eight percent in the UK). A linear probability model 
(LPM), probit, and logit model all show that none of the main school 
                                      
6 Interviews were double-scored in training, with a correlation of above 0.9 between scores from 
different enumerators. 
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characteristics7 from the first round survey are correlated with the probability of 
response for the second round management survey (Table A1.6). 
 
Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Around ten percent of interviews 
were double-scored by a research manager, with an average variation in double-
marked overall scores of 0.1 - 0.2 points. Surveys benefit from being “double-
blinded” in the sense that interviewers are not influenced by their physical 
impressions of the school or knowledge of school performance, and respondents 
were not aware of the rubric against which they were being graded. Telephone 
surveys have been demonstrated in other contexts to generate data that is 
statistically indistinguishable from in-person interviewing (Garlick et al. 2016, 
Bloom et al. 2012a). 
 
We also asked a set of standard questions on school autonomy taken from the 
OECD PISA survey. Headteachers are asked who has the main responsibility for 
deciding on budget allocations, selecting teachers for hire, setting teacher salaries, 
deciding who to admit, which courses to offer, the content of courses, and which 
textbooks to use. Where the head teacher, school owner, or governing board are 
primarily responsible, this is coded as the school having autonomy over that area, 
whereas where the Ministry of Education is primarily responsible the school is 
coded as not autonomous. In line with our expectations, private schools and PPP 
schools have a similar level of autonomy, which is greater than the autonomy of 
regular government schools.  On budget autonomy, almost all private schools and 
the majority of government schools claim to have school level autonomy. On 
salaries and hiring, almost all private schools report having autonomy, compared 
                                      
7 The characteristics tested are the number of students, average socioeconomic status of students, 
years of operation, location, average fees, head teacher experience and qualifications, teacher 
qualifications, and school type. 
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with 70 percent of government schools. Private schools are also more likely to 
report autonomy on admissions, course choice, and textbook choice. On course 
content only around a quarter of schools, whether public or private report having 
autonomy, with content most commonly being determined by the Ministry of 
Education. 
 
Test Score Data 
 
Students take national standardised tests at the end of primary (PLE) and then 
again at the end of junior secondary school (UCE). Prior to 2015 this data was 
not digitised and centrally stored. In 2015 the Ark School Survey visited schools 
and collected UCE scores directly from school paper records for a sample of 
schools in 2014 and 2013. In addition, the linked PLE score (from 2009 or 2010) 
for each student was obtained from school records. From 2015, the Uganda 
National Examinations Board (UNEB) provided a full national set of individual 
student UCE results, linked to their individual PLE result. This gives a total 
sample of 43,156 students across three years from 218 schools. 
 
Students sit UCE exams in eight (or more) subjects. Their final classification is 
based on an average points score across their eight best subjects. Points are 
awarded based on the percentage mark in exams, with one point as the best 
possible score corresponding a mark of 80 - 100 percent on the exam, and nine 
points being the worst possible score, corresponding to a mark of 0 - 39 percent. 
Our main outcome variable is the aggregate point score across eight subjects 
(inverted so that positive coefficients mean a better result, and standardised so 
that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one, to allow for easier 
interpretation of estimated coefficients). 
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PLE scores are scored in a similar manner from one to nine points for each of the 
four individual subjects (English, Maths, Science, and Social Studies). For the 
prior test score variable, again, I take the aggregate points score across these four 
subjects, invert it and standardise it.  
 
Other School Characteristics 
 
I also make use of a range of other school characteristics taken from the 2015 Ark 
school survey, including a school-average student socioeconomic status index 
(following Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), the total number of students, average 
tuition fees charged, and number of years in operation.  
 
The Ark School Survey was carried out in 2015 with a nationally representative 
sample stratified across Uganda’s four regions and across school type (public and 
private). Ten districts were sampled from each of the Central, Western, and 
Eastern regions, and six from the less populated Northern region. For each 
district ten schools were randomly sampled, of which four were government 
schools and six private schools.  
 
Public schools are on average larger than private schools, though PPP schools are 
closer in size to public schools as they receive a government subsidy per pupil 
place. Schools of all types report charging tuition (and other) fees, despite this 
not being officially permitted for government schools and PPP schools. Of the 
fully private schools, around half are non-profit. 95 percent of schools use 
academic selection criteria. The majority of schools (55 percent) are religious. The 
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majority of government schools are in rural areas, with private schools and PPP 
schools more prevalent in urban and peri-urban areas. 
 
Average socioeconomic status of students is estimated with a household asset 
survey administered to students in the fourth grade of secondary school (S4) 
following Filmer and Pritchett (2001). This data is not linked to individual test 
score results as those students had already left the school, but instead gives an 
estimate of school-average socioeconomic status. Students are private schools are 
0.15 standard deviations higher than average socioeconomic status. 
 
Headteachers and teachers have fewer years of experience in private schools than 
in government schools, and are less likely to have higher qualifications, in line 
with private schools in general paying lower salaries and having lower job security 
than in the public sector.  
 
School Markets 
 
In order to understand the factors that affect management quality, I assemble a 
series of additional contextual variables about the markets that schools operate 
in. First, I measure competition as the total number of schools (taken from the 
2013 Education Management Information System (EMIS)) per capita (from the 
2014 census) within a sub-county. There are 2,792 secondary schools nationally 
and 1,382 sub-counties, giving an average of two schools per subcounty. In our 
sample the median school is in a subcounty that has three schools in total.  
Second, school age in years is taken from our school survey. All government 
junior secondary school teachers must have at least a qualification from one of 
these colleges or a university. Third, I use two measures of the local supply of 
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skills, the distance from each school to a National Teacher College (NTC) is 
calculated based on the shortest distance between their GPS coordinates, and the 
local child literacy and enrolment rates are calculated from self-reports of literacy 
from the 2002 census for all children aged five to 18 years.   
 
1.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
There are a total of 1,068 government and 2,546 private secondary schools in 
Uganda. Government schools have on average nearly twice as many students as 
private schools. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for all schools (based on 2016 
administrative data), and Table 1.2 shows more detailed summary statistics for 
schools in my survey sample.  
 
On average schools in the nationally representative sample of Ugandan secondary 
schools score 2.0 points on the one to five scale, placing them above India and 
slightly below Brazil. This comparison should be taken with some caution due to 
the slight adaptations to the survey instrument. In other contexts schools tend to 
perform worse than manufacturing and retail firms. The best performing country 
that has been measured for school management is the UK at 2.9 (Bloom et al 
2015). The distribution of schools in Uganda is roughly symmetrical, with very 
few schools in Uganda scoring above three points, which is similar to the 
distribution in India, but notably different to that in Brazil where despite low 
average management scores, there is an upper tail of high performance. 
 
Management scores do not vary systematically for government, private, and PPP 
schools for either the aggregate score or any of the sub-components. Elite 
government schools (those not in the USE scheme) do score 0.4 points higher, and 
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more dramatically a chain of internationally-owned PPP schools score one point 
(two standard deviations) higher.8 The difference in overall management quality 
between elite government schools and others is present in their operations 
management (teaching quality control), target setting, and monitoring, but they 
are not better than average on teacher management. There is also substantial 
variation in management quality within school types. This variation is greatest 
for the international PPP schools, which is possibly explained by them being 
substantially newer than other schools (average of three years old). Table 1.3 
presents average management scores for other school characteristics.  
 
1.5 Empirical Approach 
1.5.1 Management and Student Performance 
 
In order to look at the relationship between school management and student 
performance, I estimate a student learning production function following (Todd & 
Wolpin, 2003), in which student achievement T is conceived of as a function of 
their ability A, and all present and past family inputs F, and school inputs S. 
 
 T =  f(A+ F+ S)             (1.1) 
 
Management quality enters this framework as a school input as a form of 
intangible capital that affects the productivity of labour and capital, can be 
invested in, and can depreciate. Equation (1.1) can then be re-written such that 
                                      
8 This finding is supported by a separate study into the same school chain (EPRC 2016) that 
found substantially greater evidence of schools having a vision and providing performance reviews 
and feedback to teachers, in the international PPP schools than in domestic PPP schools (Table 
13).  
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the partial derivative of test scores with respect to school characteristics is a 
function of management capital M, non-management labour L, capital K, and an 
efficiency term α.  
 
 dT/dS =  f(α,L,K,M)              (1.2) 
 
In practice, estimation of (1.1) is impeded by the lack of measures of student 
ability and the full history of family and school inputs. A common solution is the 
estimation of a lagged dependent variable, dynamic OLS ‘value-added’ 
specification, in which a student’s prior test score serves as a composite proxy 
variable for both their unobserved ability and all observed and unobserved prior 
home and school inputs, which allows for the estimation of the marginal effects of 
contemporaneous inputs. 
 
Here then test score T of student i at school s at time t is related to their own 
lagged performance, student characteristics X!, school characteristics S!, and 
school management quality M!. Some of these school characteristics (specifically 
average socioeconomic status of students and school fees) proxy both for family 
inputs and school inputs. I assume that management quality is persistent and 
unchanging across the four years for which there is test score data.9 
  
 Tist =  α +  β1 Tist−1 + β2 Ms + β3 Xi + β4 Ss + uist     (1.3) 
  
In principle these estimates may be biased due to non-random sorting of students 
to schools and unobserved student heterogeneity that may be correlated with 
                                      
9 In practice there is annual turnover of headteachers of around 14 percent, and so I also estimate 
the model with a single year of test score data, finding similar results.  
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both dependent and independent variables. As I only have measurements for each 
student from two time points I am unable to estimate models that include both 
student fixed effects and a dynamic component controlling directly for prior 
performance. In practice however the size of this bias has been demonstrated to 
be small. Using simulated data (Guarino, Reckase, Stacy, & Wooldridge, 2015) 
demonstrate that ‘naïve’ dynamic OLS models are more robust than other more 
complex non-experimental estimators in recovering relatively accurate teacher 
effects. Using real data various studies have shown that simple value-added 
models can recover good approximations to experimentally identified parameters. 
Several studies compare lottery estimates of school effects with observational 
value-added estimates using the same data, finding very similar results 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2013; Deming 2014). 
Focused on teachers, several studies find that observational value-added estimates 
of teacher effects in one year of a study are unbiased predictors of experimentally 
obtained value-added estimates of teacher effects from a different year (in which 
students were assigned to teacher classrooms randomly in the second year) (Kane 
and Staiger 2008; Kane et al. 2013; (Buhl-Wiggers, Kerwin, Smith, & Thornton, 
2016). Finally observational value-added estimates of the effect of private schools 
in Andhra Pradesh, India (Singh 2015), are very similar to experimental estimates 
from the same context and point in time (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
2015). 
 
An important concern in the Ugandan context is whether there are differential 
rates of dropouts between better and worse managed schools. It may be that 
better managed schools are successful primarily at encouraging under-performing 
students to leave. I argue that this is unlikely – schools are typically funded on a 
per-pupil basis either directly through fees or through per-student government 
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subsidy, giving them a strong incentive not to cut enrolment. Further, parents 
and the media judge schools primarily on the absolute number of top grades 
(Division One) achieved, and so schools are not penalised if they have a high 
number of low scoring candidates. I can also test this concern directly with the 
data on dropouts. 
 
My results could also suffer from omitted variable bias due to missing data on 
other school inputs, such as the pupil-teacher ratio. For my main results to be 
unbiased, I require that the conditional correlation should be zero (or minimal) 
between omitted variables, the management quality index, and student outcomes. 
In addition, I argue that school fees are a good proxy for key inputs such as the 
number of teachers and indeed the pupil teacher ratio, particularly given the high 
proportion of school costs that are attributable to teacher pay. 
 
1.5.2 Does Management Quality Explain the Private School Premium? 
 
In order to explore the role that management plays in explaining the effect of 
different school types (government/private/public-private partnership), I follow 
the approach of Imai et al. (2010) within the framework of a Linear Structural 
Equation Model. Concretely, I test whether the effect of school type on learning is 
mediated by management quality. The direct effect of school type on learning is 
captured in β4 in equation (1.3), in which I control for the effect of management. 
The indirect or ‘mediation’ effect of school type on learning is captured by the 
product of the coefficient of management on learning β2 in equation (1.3), and the 
coefficient of school type on management quality, ε1 in equation (1.4) below.  
 Ms= α2+ε1 Ss+vist         (1.4) 
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The total effect is then the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect. 
Identification of the mediation effect relies upon the assumption that the 
correlation between the residuals of the two equations is zero. I then estimate a 
‘sensitivity parameter’ ρ as the size of correlation that would be necessary for the 
true effect to be zero. 
   
 ρ= corr(uist,vist)          (1.5) 
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1.6 Results 
1.6.1 Management and Student Performance 
 
I find a clear positive correlation between school management and student 
performance. On average, a school with a one standard deviation higher 
management score is associated with a 0.07 standard deviation higher test score, 
after controlling for prior test scores, sex, and school characteristics (location, 
average student socioeconomic status, school size, and fees) (Table 1.4). These 
results are broadly in line with estimates from other countries (Bloom et al 
2015).10 This main result is small relative to the estimated effect of private schools 
in the context and some experimentally evaluated interventions in other contexts 
(P. Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2015), but importantly better management practice 
does not necessarily have a large financial cost, and varies substantially by school 
income level. The opportunity cost of teacher time may also be low, to the extent 
that they are not working at their full capacity. Surveys of teachers in Ugandan 
primary schools find that teachers are absent from the class during scheduled 
lessons 57 percent of the time (Bold et al., 2017). Experimental studies on 
management training suggest that interventions to improve the quality of school 
management can be highly cost effective (Fryer, 2017). Our sample includes a 
nationally representative sample of 199 schools, plus a ‘top-up’ of 11 schools from 
a network of international charity-run PPP schools. To show that the main result 
                                      
10 Estimates for other countries (Bloom et al 2015) are based on school-average test scores rather 
than individual student test scores, and so need to be shrunk to account for unobserved within-
school variation in test scores in order to allow for a direct comparison with my student-level 
estimates. Collapsing individual student test scores to school-averages reduces the standard 
deviation across units by around half (based on 2012 PISA data). When scores are then 
standardised (to z-scores), ‘effects’ on school-average scores are therefore roughly twice as large as 
‘effects’ on individual student scores. Adjusted estimates for within-school variation vary slightly 
across countries but remain close to 0.5 in both the PISA data and my Uganda data. 
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is not driven by the inclusion of these schools, I show in column 5 the main 
specification on only the locally run schools, finding little difference in the 
coefficient of management.  
 
Table 1.4: Regression of Student Test Scores on School Management 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Management (Z-Score) 0.198*** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.070** 0.065** 
 (0.067) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Test Score  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Controls   Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls   Yes Yes Yes 
School Type    Yes Yes 
      
N (Students) 53,449 53,449 53,449 53,449 50,990 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 199 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.023 0.537 0.559 0.568 0.575 
Notes: Column (5) excludes the international charity PPP schools from the sample, leaving a 
nationally representative sample of Ugandan secondary schools. Std. Err. adjusted for clustering 
by school. School controls include number of students, fee level & average student household asset 
index. Location controls include region fixed effects, and dummy variables for 
Kampala/Urban/Rural. Controls for headteacher characteristics are omitted due to missing data 
reducing the effective sample size, but including these controls does not substantially alter the 
results.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Breaking down the overall management index into the four main components 
suggests that target-setting and people management are each independently 
correlated with student performance (Table 1.5). These results are similar to 
those in the international study, where people management has the largest 
relationship with performance followed by target-setting, monitoring, and 
operations (though there is no a priori reason why the sub-components of 
management should have equal weight in systems with different binding 
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constraints to improved performance). I also test the effect of a collection of five 
management sub-indicators highlighted by Dobbie and Fryer (2013) as 
components of success. This ‘Dobbie-Fryer index’ of sub-indicators is significantly 
correlated with performance after controlling for school characteristics, but with a 
smaller magnitude than the overall measure of management.  
 
Table 1.5: Regression of Test Scores on Management sub-Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Management (Z-Score) 0.070**     
 (0.030)     
Operations (Z-Score)  0.043    
  (0.030)    
Targets (Z-Score)   0.076***   
   (0.028)   
Monitoring (Z-Score)    0.032  
    (0.023)  
People (Z-Score)     0.052** 
     (0.025) 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N (Students) 53,449 53,449 53,449 53,449 53,449 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 210 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.568 0.567 0.568 0.566 0.567 
Notes: Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. The overall management index is the mean of the 
four subcomponents, each separately standardised and entered independently here. School controls 
include number of students, fee rates, ownership, student household asset index, location, and 
noise controls for the survey enumerator  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
I test for a range of interactions of management quality with student and school 
characteristics, finding little evidence for heterogeneous effects, despite the prior 
belief that better managed schools might put more attention on high potential 
students, as school reputation tends to depend on the number of candidates 
achieving the top grade. Looking at interactions of management with school 
  
33 
characteristics; ownership, location, size, average socioeconomic status, and level 
of fees are all statistically insignificant. The one statistically significant 
interaction is with the dropout rate between S3 and the final S4 exam, implicitly 
a selection effect rather than a treatment effect, which is greater in better-
managed schools. One explanation for this could be that better managed schools 
might encourage students not to take the final exam if they are not expected to 
do well, even conditional on their prior performance. The effect of management 
remains of similar magnitude when excluding specific types of schools (such as 
elite government and international PPP schools).  
 
Robustness 
 
An obvious concern is that better managed schools may perform better for 
reasons besides management. Controls for student prior test score, student 
socioeconomic status, and school fees all reduce but do not eliminate the 
coefficient on management, suggesting that there is some selection bias in the 
effect of management on test scores before controlling for student intake. In the 
value-added specification applied here I assume that prior test scores account for 
unobserved student ability, as well as all past inputs, both home and school. As 
these prior test scores come four years before the final test score, I need a 
measure of home inputs for the four years between the two tests. Here I assume 
that the measure of student socioeconomic status and average school fees paid are 
able to serve as a proxy for home inputs. I do not have any measurements at the 
classroom or teacher-level, though the hypothesised effect of management on 
performance should work through improved teaching at the classroom level 
through better support and accountability for classroom teachers. 
  
34 
Selection on unobservables 
 
In Table 1.6 below I implement the Altonji et al. (2005)  / Oster (2016) bounding 
exercise, which estimates the amount of selection δ on unobservables that would 
be necessary for the estimated coefficient of management β on student test scores 
to be zero. The selection parameter δ is expressed relative to (as a percentage of) 
the degree of selection on observables. A selection parameter δ of 1 is suggested as 
a heuristic cut-off point – so we assume that selection on unobservables is likely 
to be not greater than selection on observables, given that covariates are typically 
selected purposively in order to account for as much of the variation in the 
dependent variable as possible. In this case this assumption seems reasonable, as 
a student’s lagged test score alone accounts for more than 50 percent of the 
variation in test scores.  The bottom two rows indicate that if we thought that 
achieving an R2 of 1 was realistic, then selection on unobservables would only 
have to be 57 percent of the amount of selection on observables for a β of zero to 
be possible. However Oster (2016) argues that an R2 of 1 is unrealistic and too 
demanding a hurdle (only 10 percent of results published in top four journals over 
the previous five years pass this hurdle), and a more achievable benchmark for 
Rmax is 1.3 times the R-squared achieved in the most complete specification R. In 
this case, my result ‘passes’ this test, in that selection on unobservables would 
have to be greater (1.46x) than selection on observables for the coefficient on 
management to actually be zero. 
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Table 1.6: Altonji et al (2005) / Oster (2016) sensitivity analysis 
  
 
Model with Controls 
 
β 0.070 
R 0.568 
  
Model without controls 
 
β 0.198 
R 0.023 
  
Sensitivity Parameters: 
 
δ(Rmax= 1,  β =0) 0.69 
δ(Rmax=R×1.3,  β =0) 1.75 
Notes: The sensitivity parameter δ is estimated as a function of the coefficient of management on 
student value-added β and the r-squared R in two models; with and without the full set of control 
variables.  
 
 
Dropouts 
 
An important concern in this context is whether there are differential rates of 
dropout between the two examinations for better and worse managed schools. 
The value-added specification will produce consistent estimates only if dropouts 
are caused only by time-invariant student characteristics. The overall decrease in 
the size of the cohort that started S1 in 2011 and entered S4 in 2014 is 16 
percent11. First, I argue that the major causes of student dropouts are student-
specific demand-side factors rather than being related to school quality. Of people 
who completed one of the first three grades of secondary school but did not take 
the UCE exam, 69 percent reported that they left school due to trouble paying 
fees. Just one percent reported leaving due to poor academic progress (Uganda 
National Panel Survey Wave 3, 2012). 
 
                                      
11 Analysis of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2015 Statistical Abstract 
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Common approaches to dealing with bias caused by attrition include Heckman 
selection models and inverse probability weighting of observations, which can 
produce unbiased estimates if ‘selection’ or attrition is caused by observable 
individual characteristics.  As this student-level sample only includes those who 
have taken the UCE exam, I do not have data on students that did drop out, so 
cannot estimate the probability of attrition within the sample. As an 
approximation however, I can look at the national distribution of primary school 
leaving exam (PLE) scores by gender, and estimate the probability of individual 
dropout based on the relative proportions of each score by sex for the pre-
secondary entry PLE results and the PLE results of those taking the secondary 
certificate. As I do not have a credible instrument (a variable that causes 
selection but not the outcome) I do not estimate the Heckman selection model, 
but instead apply inverse probability weighting. Relying on the full distribution of 
PLE scores rather than the distribution of PLE scores for students that have 
already started secondary school relies upon the assumption that this distribution 
is not substantially different. I argue that this is a reasonable assumption, as the 
PLE is optional and costly, and is typically taken only by students who do intend 
to progress to secondary school, for which it is a requirement. Weighting 
observations by their inverse probability does not substantially affect the 
coefficient on management.  
 
A final check is looking at the correlation between the reported number of 
dropouts between S3 and the final S4 exam at the school-level, for which I do 
have data, and the school management score. There is no systematic relationship 
between this school-level measure of dropouts and school management. In my 
sample, this rate of dropout between students in S3 and those taking the UCE 
exam at the end of S4 is 21 percent, above the overall national rate of reported 
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dropout from students enrolled in S1 in 2011 to those enrolled in S4 in 2014 was 
16 percent, down from a higher dropout rate in previous years.  
 
Finally, I note that schools are typically funded on a per-pupil basis (either 
directly through fees or through per-student government subsidy) and there is 
weak accountability for schools if students do perform poorly on final exams, 
giving them an incentive to discourage dropouts and keep students enrolled. 
 
Test Score Measurement 
 
Another concern here is the measurement of the dependent variable (UCE test 
scores), and whether any flaws in official test results as proxies for student 
learning is correlated with any of the independent variables.  If a better managed 
school was only better at preparing students for exams without them actually 
learning any more, results for the effect of management on performance would be 
biased upwards. One check available for this is a question asked of Head Teachers 
about the amount of exam preparation carried out in schools. Controlling for 
exam preparation makes no difference to the coefficient of management on 
performance (Table A1.11). Any ‘classical’ measurement error in prior test scores 
will lead just to attenuation of the effect of these prior test scores on secondary 
scores. I also test alternative scaling of the test score measure. Using an ordinal 
logit across test grades produces similar results to the linear approximation used 
in the main specifications (Table A1.11). 
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Management Index 
 
The main management index I use is a weighted average of the 20 sub-areas of 
management, first taking the average of sub-areas for each of the four main sub-
components, and then taking the average of these four sub-components. The 
relationship between management and student performance is robust to 
aggregating the individual question areas of management in different ways, either 
by simple averaging across all 20, or by principal components analysis (Table 
A1.11). 
 
Headteacher turnover 
 
Here I have assumed that management quality is time invariant, but in practice 
there is some degree of headteacher turnover. I do not have data on the length of 
time that headteachers in my sample have served in their current school, but 
overall the turnover rate in government schools is 14 percent. Restricting my 
sample to test score data only from the same year that the management score 
was collected (2016) and discarding the test score data for the other years does 
not substantially alter the main results (Table A1.11).  
 
1.6.2 Does Management Explain the effect of Private Schools? 
 
Without controlling for management quality, private schools perform 0.28 
standard deviations better than government schools, and PPP schools 0.14 
standard deviations better. A common explanation for any better performance of 
private schools relative to government schools is better management. Here 
however I find no evidence that private schools or PPP schools are any better 
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managed than government schools. Although school management varies 
substantially, there are few differences on average between major types of schools 
(unlike in OECD countries where ‘autonomous government schools’ - here 
referred to as PPP schools - score highest on management). In Uganda there are 
two exceptions; first a small number of selective elite government schools with 
high fees and wealthy students, that are on average 0.4 points better managed 
than other government schools, and second a chain of internationally-owned non-
profit PPP schools run by the UK charity PEAS, which score 1.1 points better 
than average.  
 
Elite government schools are substantially better resourced than average, which 
might explain their advantage (despite this holding after controlling for student 
SES and school fees). International PPP schools on the other hand have primarily 
the same level of resources as local PPP schools. One plausible explanation for 
this better performance is the notion of technology transfer from the international 
owners of the chain from the UK to Uganda (in line with findings that subsidiary 
manufacturing firms of multinational companies perform better than domestically 
owned firms (Bloom et al, 2014 and Bloom et al., 2012b).   
 
This is likely supported by the existence of an effective within-network 
accountability system, based on a rigorous modern inspections regime that 
combines official examinations data (Hanushek and Raymond 2005; Hanushek et 
al. 2013) with subjective performance assessment (Hussain, 2015). Anecdotally, 
the supervision model for the international school chain includes detailed targets 
for a range of performance indicators, high-stakes accountability for head teachers 
with the removal of those under-performing and promotion of those successful, 
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and on-going support and challenge throughout the year. Unfortunately I do not 
however have the necessary variation in this study to test this hypothesis.  
 
To test whether the quality of management explains the difference in performance 
of school types, I run two regressions of test scores on school type and the full set 
of control variables, first without and then with the management quality variable 
(Table 1.7). Adding the control for management quality (Column 3) makes little 
difference to the coefficient on private or PPP schools, but dramatically reduces 
the size of the coefficient on international PPP schools, which loses statistical 
significance. Following the approach to causal mediation outlined by (Imai et al., 
2010), I subject this latter finding to a sensitivity analysis. Although this 
framework confirms the finding that management mediates the entire effect of 
international PPP schools, a sensitivity analysis shows that the effect is not 
robust to substantial correlation between the error terms from the test score and 
the management regression. The threshold value ρ at which the mediation effect 
would be zero is just 0.07 (Table 1.8). 
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Table 1.7: Regression of Test Scores on School Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Elite Government (not USE) 1.413*** 0.514*** 0.482*** 
 (0.211) (0.143) (0.146) 
Private (not USE) 0.483*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 
 (0.130) (0.061) (0.058) 
Private PPP (USE) -0.031 0.144*** 0.150*** 
 (0.110) (0.042) (0.042) 
International PPP (PEAS) 0.204 0.256** 0.108 
 (0.160) (0.116) (0.126) 
Management (Z-Score)   0.070** 
   (0.030) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Test Score  Yes Yes 
Location Controls  Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes Yes 
    
N (Students) 53,449 53,449 53,449 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 
N (Years) 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.115 0.566 0.568 
Notes: Std. Err. Adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include number of students, fee 
level, & average student household asset index. Location controls include region fixed effects, and 
dummy variables for Kampala/Urban/Rural.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.8: Mediation Regression of Test Scores on International Schools 
 (1) (2) 
ACME (Management) 0.161*** 0.184*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Direct Effect (IPPP) -0.012 -0.094** 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
Total Effect 0.150*** 0.090*** 
 (0.213) (0.023) 
   
Controls  Yes 
Obs. (Students) 51,519 51,519 
Obs. (Schools) 210 210 
% of Tot Effect mediated 1.073 2.044 
H0: ACME=0 0.000 0.000 
Threshold ρ at which ACME = 0 0.933 0.088 
Notes: The ‘Average Causal Mediation Effect’ (ACME) is the product of the coefficient of 
management on test scores, and international PPP (IPPP) schools on management. The direct 
effect is the coefficient of IPPP schools directly on test scores. The total effect is the sum of the 
mediation effect and the direct effect. The last row reports the threshold value of the unobservable 
ρ correlation, above which the true ACME would be zero. 
 
 
1.6.3 What Explains Management? 
 
Finally, going beyond school type I look for other factors that might explain 
variation in management quality.  Starting with the accountability framework 
laid out in the 2004 World Development Report, we can think of two possible 
routes of accountability for public service providers that might lead to improved 
school management – a) the long route of accountability from citizens through 
the state then down to service providers, or b) the short direct route through 
consumer or user pressure on providers.  
 
With regards to top-down accountability we observe little variation across schools 
- students from all schools take the same common entrance and exit 
examinations. Government schools are subject to a very weak, process-focused 
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inspections regime. One part of this relationship where we do observe variation is 
the degree of autonomy that schools are provided with, a common focus of studies 
on school performance. Here I do have measures of school autonomy and can test 
the correlation between this measure and school management. 
 
With bottom-up accountability, the responsiveness of school management (and 
value-added performance) to parent/customer demand depends on how we view 
the school choice decision. If parents are seriously interested in quality and value-
added, then we might think of competition as driving up standards. In this case 
the model outlined in Bloom et al (2015), in which management is a technology 
that affects the productivity of inputs (capital and labour), provides several 
intuitive predictions. Management increases performance, but also there is likely 
to be (i) a positive effect of competition on management, (ii) a positive effect of 
firm age on management, as the result of a survival/selection process in which 
poorly managed firms are more likely to go out of business and close (and 
therefore not reach old age), and (iii) that management is increasing in the local 
supply of skills (as the cost of hiring good teachers is reduced). An alternative 
theory is one in which parents care primarily about school reputation. When 
schools are also able to select their pupils (as they are in this context), 
competition can lead to segregation by ability, and no actual increase in school 
performance measured as value-added (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015). 
 
I test these predictions in the specification below, in which management M is 
estimated as a function of school characteristics S, headteacher characteristics 
HT, and community characteristics C (including the number of nearby schools 
per capita, the distance to a National Teacher Training College, and the quality 
of schooling in the sub-county 13 years ago).  
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 Ms= α+ β1 Ss+ β2 HTh+β3 Cc+ uist      (1.6) 
 
The only consistently significant school characteristics are school autonomy, the 
local skills index, and school type (elite government schools and PEAS 
international PPP schools are both better managed than average, even after 
controlling for other characteristics). There is no statistically significant 
correlation between the degree of local competition (measured by the number of 
schools per capita in the local sub-county), school age, headteacher experience or 
education, or school size or socioeconomic status of students (Table 1.9).   
 
I had expected to find that private schools would score more highly than 
government schools at least on people or teacher management, due to the 
explanation for greater efficiency in the private sector in similar contexts so 
frequently being due to greater accountability for teachers. Looking at individual 
items with the overall people/teacher management score, private schools do in 
fact score better than public schools on hiring and recruitment, but no better in 
the other items (attracting talent, rewarding and promoting high performers, and 
dealing with poor performers). 
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Table 1.9: Regression of Management on School and Market Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Schools per capita (Z-Score) 0.014 0.040 0.043* 0.035 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Autonomy Score 0.266** 0.220* 0.226* 0.226* 
 (0.112) (0.121) (0.122) (0.123) 
School Age in Years (Z-Score) -0.033 0.041 0.033 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) 
Skills Index 0.061** 0.024 0.037* 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
HT is a rookie -0.144** -0.023 -0.025 -0.041 
 (0.073) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) 
HT has postgrad -0.047 -0.008 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
Government (USE)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (.) (.) (.) 
Elite Government (non-USE)  0.220** 0.229** 0.156 
  (0.098) (0.097) (0.132) 
Private PPP (USE)  0.011 0.013 -0.002 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) 
Private (non-USE)  -0.080 -0.077 -0.109 
  (0.078) (0.080) (0.089) 
International PPP (PEAS)  1.059*** 1.071*** 1.025*** 
  (0.181) (0.177) (0.272) 
Size (Students: z-score)    -0.010 
    (0.032) 
SES (Z-score)    0.049 
    (0.051) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes 
     
N 169 169 169 163 
r2 0.076 0.449 0.460 0.350 
Notes: Schools per capita is defined within each sub-county. The autonomy score is the average of 
7 dummy variables for whether the school has autonomy over admissions, budgets, hiring, salaries, 
content, courses, and textbooks. School age is taken from the 2015 Ark survey. The skills index is 
comprised of 3 variables – the distance from the school to one of the 7 National Teacher Colleges 
(NTC), the local (sub-county) literacy rate in 2002 and the local (sub-county) enrolment rate in 
2002 (of children aged 5-18 at the time). School controls include number of pupils, socioeconomic 
status, region, and urban location.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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We are left with a puzzle – that despite better management practices improving 
school performance at little extra cost, most schools do not adopt them. Some 
clues are provided by the literature on technology adoption in developing 
countries, which identifies a number of possible constraints to adoption (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2010; Jack 2011). The informational constraint seems particularly 
important in this context – it may simply be that most school leaders are not 
aware of what good modern management practices are, and how they can be 
applied in schools. One piece of evidence for this hypothesis is the very low 
correlation (0.145) between head teachers’ self-assessment of the quality of 
management in their school with my measure. Neither do these self-assessments of 
school management correlate with student performance. Another possibly 
important constraint is on the supply-side – where there is little widespread 
provision by either market or state of management training in this context for 
school leaders.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to a growing literature on the importance of the quality of 
management practices for school performance. I present the first internationally 
comparable measure of school management quality from sub-Saharan Africa, 
placing the management quality of Ugandan schools in international context. 
Management matters for school performance, measured by growth in individual 
student test scores (or “value-added”). Further, though there is some level of 
higher spending which can lead to better management (as demonstrated by the 
better performance of elite government schools), amongst non-elite schools there 
is little correlation between school fees or other school resources and management 
performance, showing that in principle better management can be a low-cost 
strategy for improving learning outcomes. School management is not significantly 
better in private or public-private partnership schools.  
 
I find few variables that matter for explaining variation in school management. 
Autonomy may provide the opportunity for better management, but is not in 
itself sufficient. An international PPP chain does manage to achieve substantially 
better management quality and correspondingly improved student test scores, 
which I argue is due to a better top-down accountability and performance 
management system, though I do not have the necessary variation in the data to 
confirm this hypothesis. Future research could usefully address this question of 
how to improve school management at scale, and the role that performance 
management systems and school inspections can play. 
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Appendix A1.1: Figures 
Figure A1.1: Map of Ugandan School Locations 
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Figure A1.2: Management Score by Country and School Type 
 
Notes: Scores from Uganda are from my survey, scores for other countries from Bloom et al (2015) 
 
 
Figure A1.3: Distribution of School Management Scores within Countries  
 
Notes: Scores for US, India, and Brazil are taken from Bloom et al (2015) 
1.7
1.9
2
2
2
2.1
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.9
3
0 5
Management Score
India
Uganda - Private
Uganda - PPP
Uganda - Public
Brazil
Italy
Germany
US
Canada
Sweden
UK
Uganda - International PPP
0
.5
1
1.
5
Ke
rn
el 
De
ns
ity
1 2 3 4 5
Management Score
US Uganda
India Brazil
  
50 
Figure A1.4: Distribution of School Management Scores by School Type 
 
Notes: The distribution of management quality is presented here by school type. The distributions 
for public, private, and PPP schools all overlap, only elite government (omitted) and international 
PPP schools (IPPP) performing substantially better. Scores for UK schools are overlaid from 
Bloom et al. 
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Figure A1.5: Management and School Value-added 
 
Notes: School VA is calculated as the simple school mean of residuals from a student growth 
regression, including controls for student prior test score, sex, and year. 
 
 
 
Figure A1.6: Heterogeneous effects of management 
 
Notes: Effect sizes estimated for each possible prior test score (PLE) with a piecewise regression, 
entering the interaction of each individual PLE score as a dummy variable multiplied by the 
school management score. Regressions control for school characteristics, with standard errors 
clustered. 
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Figure A1.7: Management Score and School Autonomy 
  
Notes: Bivariate correlations between measures of autonomy and management show a weakly 
positive correlation for overall management (on the left) and a stronger correlation for staff/people 
autonomy and staff/people management (on the right). 
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Appendix A1.2: Tables 
Table A1.1: Score by Individual Management Item   
 
Elite Gov 
(Non-
USE) 
Govern-
ment 
(USE) 
PPP 
(USE) 
Private 
(Non-
USE) 
Foreign 
PPP 
(USE) 
All 
Schools 
Operations       
1.Planning 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.6 2.4 
2. Leading teaching 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 3.4 2.1 
3.Personalisation 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.2 2.0 
4. Assessments & data 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 3.1 2.0 
5. Adopting best practice 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1 
Monitoring       
6. Identifying problems 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.7 2.2 
7. Performance tracking 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 3.4 2.1 
Targets       
8. Target balance 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 3.0 2.0 
9. Target Stretch 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.5 1.7 
10.Accountability 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.7 1.9 
People        
11. Hiring teachers 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.3 
12. Attracting teachers 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.4 2.3 
13. Rewarding teachers 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.6 2.3 
14. Promoting teachers 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 3.1 2.0 
15. Poor performers 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.3 
Leadership & Ops       
16.Vision 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.2 
17.Budgeting 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.3 
Notes: This table shows average scores by school type for each of the individual sub-component 
questions that make up the overall aggregate management index. 
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Table A1.2: International Regressions of Student Test Scores on Management 
 All 
(excl 
Ug) 
Bra Can Ind Swe US UK Ug 
 Score Score Score Score Score Score VA VA 
Mgmt  
(z-score) 
0.23*** 0.10** 0.61 0.50** 0.24 0.17** 0.88** 
 
(0.044) (0.050) (0.368) (0.243) (0.206) (0.080) (0.369) 
 
School SD 0.49 0.59 0.47 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.46 
Adj Effect 
Size 
0.12*** 0.06** 0.28 0.24** 0.13 0.08** 0.45** 0.07** 
School 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pupil 
controls 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs-
ervations 
1002 472 77 152 82 133 78 210 
Notes: Bloom et al (2015) estimate effects of management on school average performance 
(standardised to mean 0, standard deviation 1). In order to render these estimates comparable 
with the Uganda estimates using individual student data, I make an adjustment for the standard 
deviation of school-average test scores (calculated from 2012 PISA data for non-Uganda 
countries). The adjusted effect size is therefore an estimate from these studies for the effect of 
management on individual student performance.  
 
Table A1.3: School Leadership & Management in PPP Schools 
  
None Limited Good N 
Evidence of school vision & mission 
Foreign 
 
4 7 11 
Domestic 6 5 5 17 
Evidence of performance reviews & 
feedback 
Foreign 
  
11 11 
Domestic 3 6 8 17 
Source: Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), 2016 
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Table A1.4: Regression of Individual Subject Test Scores on Management 
 Eng Mat Che Phy Bio His Geo Hum 
Management  
(Z-Score) 
0.069*** 0.031 0.010 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.034 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032) 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N 34,437 34,416 34,400 34,352 34,361 18,497 18,647 18,103 
N_clust 210 210 210 210 210 191 191 191 
Dep var Mean 7.2 6.7 8.2 8.2 7.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 
Dep var St Dev 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.2 1.7 1.7 
Std. Err. Adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size, fees, & student household 
asset index. Location controls include region fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Kampala/Urban/Rural.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table A1.5: Regression of Student Test Scores on the Dobbie-Fryer Index 
 VA VA VA VA 
     
Dobbie-Fryer Index (Z-Score) 0.060*** 0.041*   
 (0.022) (0.025)   
Management (Z-Score)   0.085*** 0.070** 
   (0.027) (0.030) 
School Controls No Yes No Yes 
     
N (Students) 53,449 53,449 53,449 53,449 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 
N (Year) 3 3 3 3 
Notes: The “Dobbie-Fryer index” is my best approximation to the 5 key practices included in 
their actual index, taken from my school management survey. These include the sub-questions on 
data-driven teaching, the adoption of best practices, personalization of teaching, and leadership).  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.6: Selection regression of Choice to Participate in the Management 
Survey on School Characteristics 
 OLS Probit Logit 
Average UCE -0.014* -0.036* -0.059* 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.035) 
Average PLE 0.023 0.059 0.097 
 (0.020) (0.052) (0.085) 
Number of Students (2015) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Student HH Asset Index -0.051 -0.132 -0.212 
 (0.046) (0.121) (0.195) 
Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Headteacher Years Experience 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.018) 
HT has postgrad 0.054 0.147 0.234 
 (0.064) (0.169) (0.274) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 323 323 323 
r2 0.028   
Note: None of the location controls (dummies for region and urban/rural) are statistically 
significant in any of the specifications.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.7: Secondary School Enrolment and Dropout Rate 
Year S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 to S4 
Dropout 
Rate 
S3 to S4 
Dropout 
Rate 
2008 291,797      
2009 296,400 280,026     
2010 324,487 277,345 256,385    
2011 320,273 279,267 230,989 222,226 24% 13% 
2012  296,297 259,003 216,754 27% 6% 
2013   284,919 250,274 23% 3% 
2014    268,253 16% 6% 
Notes: Data from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2015 Statistical Abstract. Implied dropout rates 
are estimated by comparing the total size of each cohort as they progress through time and 
grades.  
 
 
Table A1.8: Regression of Student Test Scores on School Management 
(Comparison of OLS and Random Effects Multi-level model) 
 OLS OLS RE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Management (Z-Score) 0.085*** 0.059** 0.062*** 0.059** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.087) (0.027) 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes 
Prior Test Score Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Controls  Yes  Yes 
School Controls  Yes  Yes 
School Type  Yes  Yes 
     
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 43,156 41,818 
N (Schools) 210 210 223 210 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.529 0.569 0.529 0.569 
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size, fees, & student 
socioeconomic status. Location controls include sub-region fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Kampala/Urban/Rural.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.9: Heterogeneous effects of Management on Student Value-Added, by 
Student Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Management (Z-Score) 0.066** 0.120* 0.051**   
 (0.030) (0.071) (0.024)   
Female x Mgmt -0.014     
 (0.018)     
PLE x Mgmt  0.003    
  (0.002)    
PLE Division 1 x Mgmt   0.062   
   (0.046)   
Targets (Z-Score)    0.161*** 0.057** 
    (0.061) (0.024) 
PLE x Targets    0.008**  
    (0.004)  
PLE Division 1 x Targets     0.020 
     (0.020) 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 210 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. PLE is a continuous variable with an aggregate points 
score ranging from 4 to 28. PLE Division 1 is a dummy variable for whether the student obtained 
the top grade in their primary exam. The positive coefficient on the interaction of PLE scores 
with Targets indicates that the effect of secondary school target-setting practice is greater for 
students with better predicted test scores (based on their primary test score). School controls 
include number of students, fee rates, ownership, student socioeconomic status, location, and 
'noise controls' or enumerator  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.10: Heterogeneous effects of Management on Student Value-Added, by 
School Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Management (Z-Score) 0.064** 0.062** 0.060** 0.067*** 0.062** 0.070*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Urban x Mgmt -0.070      
 (0.073)      
Students x Mgmt  -0.010     
  (0.033)     
SES x Mgmt   0.045    
   (0.030)    
Dropout rate (Z-Score)    0.038   
    (0.025)   
Dropouts x Mgmt    0.080***   
    (0.028)   
Tuition Fees x Mgmt     0.023  
     (0.034)  
School Age x Mgmt      0.036 
      (0.032) 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 40,067 41,818 39,781 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 205 210 203 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.558 0.569 0.561 
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. Urban and Peri-Urban are dummy variables. School 
controls include number of students, fee rates, ownership, student socioeconomic status, location, 
and 'noise controls' or survey enumerator  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A1.11: Robustness Checks 
 
(1) 
 
Main 
Spec 
 
 
(2) 
 
Control 
for 
Exam 
Prep 
(3) 
 
Ordered 
Logit 
 
 
(4) 
 
Alternate 
PCA 
Index 
 
(5) 
 
Alternate 
Un-
weighted 
Index 
 (6) 
 
2016 
Only 
 
 
       
Management 
(Preferred Index) 
0.074** 0.077** 0.188**   0.079**  
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.080)   (0.034)    
% of Time on Exam 
Prep 
 0.000                     
  (0.001)                     
Management  
(PCA Index) 
   0.070**                   
    (0.031)                   
Management 
(Unweighted Mean) 
    0.054**                  
     (0.026)                  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes                  
Prior Test Score Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
School Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
       
N (Students) 53,449 52,044 15,133 53,449 53,449 18,638    
N (Schools) 210 204 208 210 210 190    
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 1 
R-squared 0.499 0.499 0.220 0.499 0.499 0.529    
Notes: This table presents a series of robustness checks. Column 1 is the main preferred 
specification. Column 2 includes controls for the share of time spent on exam preparation. Column 
3 uses one of four exam “Division” categories as an alternative outcome indicator, and an ordered 
logit specification. The reported R-squared is the pseudo R-squared. Column 4 presents results 
with the management sub-components aggregated using a Principle Components Analysis (PCA). 
Column 5 presents results with the un-weighted mean of the sub-components. Column 6 presents 
results for 2016 only. Std. Err. adjusted for clustering by school. School controls include number of 
students, fee level & average student household asset index. Location controls include region fixed 
effects, and dummy variables for Kampala/Urban/Rural. Controls for headteacher characteristics 
are omitted due to missing data reducing the effective sample size, but including these controls 
does not substantially alter the results.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A1.3: Edits to World Management Survey 
 
The original World Management Survey schools instrument includes a rubric with 
level descriptors for one (worst), three, and five (best).  The approach proposed 
by (Lemos & Scur, 2016) designed specifically for developing countries includes 
both a horizontal and vertical expansion of the tool, with level descriptors for half 
point levels at the bottom end of the scale (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5) in order to 
capture variation in countries where scores are clustered at the lower end of scale, 
and including three separate sub-areas within each of the 20 question areas. 
During piloting for the Uganda survey it was decided to expand the original 
rubric to include level descriptors for each of the levels one to five, and to allow 
enumerators to score 0.5 points where they felt that responses fell between the 
two level descriptions, rather than describing explicitly what the 0.5 points were 
in the rubric. It was also opted to maintain the shorter set of 20 areas rather than 
expanding to 60, on the grounds that preventing respondent fatigue could 
outweigh any possible sacrifice in precision here. During pre-testing and piloting 
it was also decided to further simplify the original list of 20 areas to a combined 
and shortened list of 11 areas, to reduce excessive duplication and repetition of 
questioning and to limit the length of time required from a school head teacher. 
These changes are summarized in the table below. 
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Table A1.1: Changes to Original World Management Survey 
Original WMS 
Adapted 
Instrument 
Rationale for changes 
A. Operations 
Standardisation of Instructional Planning  
Original category 
retained 
Original categories retained.  
 
New category added to capture 
important school management role 
missing from original survey 
Personalisation of Instruction and 
Learning 
Data-Driven Planning  
Adopting Educational Best Practices 
Instructional Leadership New category 
B. Monitoring 
Continuous Improvement Category retained One category retained unchanged, the 
remaining four categories combined into 
one. In pre-testing we found that these 
questions/categories were very repetitive 
and overlapping and combined aspects of 
the categories into questions within a 
single category 
Performance Tracking 
Categories 
combined 
 
Performance Review 
Performance Dialogue 
Consequence Management 
C. Target Setting 
Target Balance Categories 
combined 
One category retained unchanged. Two 
categories combined where there is 
overlap. Some aspects of target 
interconnection were not relevant in this 
context – for example there are no 
district or national targets with which 
school targets could be interconnected. 
Two categories omitted - in pre-testing 
these questions were repetitive providing 
little new information 
Target Interconnection 
Target Stretch 
Original category 
retained 
Target Time Horizon Categories 
omitted  
Target Clarity & Comparability 
D. People Management 
Recruitment  New category Added from Lemos & Scur (2016) 
Rewarding High Performers Original category 
retained 
 
Fixing Poor Performers 
Promoting High Performers 
Categories 
combined 
Categories combined due to overlap and 
repetition in questions.  Continuing Professional Development 
Retaining High Performers 
Attracting High Performers  Category retained  
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Chapter 2: Low Returns to Low-Cost Private Schools: Experimental 
Evidence from Delhi 
 
A pre-analysis plan was filed with the American Economic Association’s registry for 
randomized controlled trials, ID AEARCTR-0002239 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Enrollment in India’s private schools rose by 16 million students between 2011 
and 2015, surpassing half of all children in urban areas. Meanwhile enrollment in 
free government schools declined in absolute terms by 11 million. With median 
annual fees at around 10 percent of per capita income, parents often spend a large 
portion of their income on private schools. Providing poor families with access to 
these schools is a major focus of government policy under the 2009 Right to 
Education Act. While policy discussions often attribute demand for private 
schools to dissatisfaction with the quality of public education (PROBE Team, 
1999; The Economist, 2015), other factors may be as important, including 
demand for geographic proximity or social exclusivity. 
 
Prior experimental evidence from rural India has shown learning impacts from 
private-school vouchers were low or zero on average (Muralidharan & 
Sundararaman, 2015), but that returns increased with school density, leading the 
authors to speculate that in urban areas, where India’s private school boom has 
been concentrated, “the effects of choice and competition may be considerably 
larger.” 
 
  
64 
In this paper we exploit a lottery for private-school vouchers conducted in 
Delhi— precisely the type of dense urban schooling market where we might 
expect the biggest learning gains.12 The voucher program, described in (Wolf, 
Egalite, & Dixon, 2015), offered vouchers to roughly 800 children in low-income 
neighborhoods in East Delhi which allowed them to attend a low-cost private 
school of their choice, tuition-free for five years. Take-up was reasonably high: 
winning the lottery led to a thirty-five percent increase in cumulative time spent 
in private school over the remaining five years of primary. 
 
We find no evidence that access to private schooling generated gains in either 
cognitive or non-cognitive skills. Voucher winners saw no differential 
improvement in test scores on mathematics (point estimate of -0.04σ, standard 
error 0.05σ) or English reading (point estimate of 0.03σ, standard error 0.05σ), 
and suffered a negative impact on Hindi reading scores (point estimate of -0.09σ, 
standard error 0.05σ). Negative impacts on Hindi are somewhat unsurprising, as 
government schools are overwhelmingly Hindi-medium whereas 49 percent of 
private schools in our sample are English medium. It is notable, though, that 
private schooling led to no statistically significant gain in English to offset this 
loss in Hindi literacy. 
 
Given these point estimates and standard errors, we interpret our null results as 
evidence of zero individual-level impact from school choice per se. However, two 
important caveats apply. First, winning a voucher increased cumulative exposure 
to private schooling by just over a third during the course of primary school. This 
implies that even if our intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates allow us to reject policy-
                                      
12 Our study districts have 12 schools per km2, compared to fewer than 1 school per km2 in the 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) study districts. 
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relevant effect sizes from receiving a voucher of this magnitude, the confidence 
interval on the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effect of actually attending a 
private school is much wider. Second, while attrition was reasonably low at 13 
percent overall, it was nearly 7 percentage-points lower among lottery winners. 
Thus the (Lee, 2009) bounds on our effects are quite wide, and leave open the 
possibility of larger effect sizes if, for instance, non-recipients of vouchers with 
particularly bad academic outcomes were significantly more likely to exit the 
sample. 
 
We provide tests of three possible explanations for these results, finding some 
support for heterogeneous effects and asymmetric information. Overall, our 
experimental results on learning outcomes are broadly consistent with existing 
evidence in India that suggests that learning gains from private schooling are 
small and only apparent in some subjects and regions.13 Analyzing longitudinal 
data on pupils in Andhra Pradesh, (Singh, 2015) finds some learning advantages 
in private schools (substantially higher learning gains in English and some modest 
and inconsistent advantages in Mathematics and Telugu), but consistent with our 
results finds negative effects on the local language (in his case Telugu, in ours 
                                      
13 Our results contrast somewhat with the original analysis of this voucher experiment by Wolf 
et al. (2015), which was based on two years of program exposure. Looking at intent-to-treat 
(ITT) effects, Wolf et al. (2015) report statistically significant learning gains of 0.15v on 
English, and insignificant gains of 0.07v in mathematics and 0.4v in Hindi, as well as larger and 
uniformly significant effects for the sub-sample of female students. In contrast, we find fairly 
precise zeros on all subjects, except for negative impacts on Hindi, and no notable gender 
differentials. We attribute this differential to three innovations in this paper. First, we test 
children after six years to study the effects of longer exposure to the program, thus results may 
naturally differ. Second, we invest in more intensive tracking of students, reducing the rate of 
attrition from 29 percent in Wolf et al. (2015) to 13 percent. Third, we base our selection of 
dependent variables and regression specifications on a pre-analysis plan registered prior to data 
collection in 2017 to preempt concerns about researcher degrees of freedom in selection of 
outcome variables and choice of sub-group analysis. We also supplement the primary academic 
outcomes with additional questions to provide further insight into the potential impacts of private 
schooling, including aspirations, psycho-social skills, well-being, and attitudes. 
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Hindi) in English medium private schools. As noted above, experimental evidence 
from the same state (Andhra Pradesh) presented in Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2015) shows no impact of private schooling on Telugu (the local 
language), Mathematics, or English, and positive impacts only on Hindi, a subject 
not taught in government schools at all.14 Notably, while the experimental results 
from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) are entirely rural, Singh (2015) 
finds no evidence of a private school advantage in urban Andhra Pradesh. 
Similarly, Desai et al. (2008) estimate positive impacts of private schooling on 
reading and mathematics overall using national survey data across India and an 
instrumental variable strategy, but no effect in Delhi specifically. Exploiting the 
Right To Education (RTE) lottery in the South Indian state of Karnataka, 
Damera (2017) finds no effect of attending private schools on learning, but a 
positive effect on student self-efficacy. Mis-targeting potentially mutes the results 
from Karnataka; although the RTE lotteries are intended for poor and 
marginalized groups, over ninety-percent of lottery losers pay out of pocket to 
attend private primary school.15  
 
                                      
14 Davies (2017) returns to the experiment described in Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
(2015) and finds that private school lottery winners in Andhra Pradesh were more likely to 
hold stronger market-oriented beliefs, be willing to pay more for private services, and express 
a preference for private service provision. We measure these outcomes only for parents, and 
find some corroboration of these findings. 
15 Effects may, of course, vary across contexts. In Punjab, Pakistan, Andrabi et al. (2011) 
estimate private school effects with value-added models, finding positive effects on learning. 
Looking further afield, a global meta-analysis considered 19 randomized trials spanning 11 
voucher programs, including two studies from India already mentioned (Wolf et al., 2015; 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015), one from Colombia where vouchers for private 
secondary schools in an urban setting generated significant learning gains and labor market 
benefits (Angrist. et al., 2002, 2006), and eight from the US (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 
2016). Formal meta-analysis found small positive effects overall, with larger effects outside of 
the United States and in programs with more years of treatment. A subsequent study from 
Louisiana not included in the Shakeel et al. (2016) review finds that participation in a school 
choice lottery lowered mathematics scores by 0.4 standard deviations (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, 
& Walters, 2018). 
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Why do parents clamor for private schools if they generate little or no additional 
learning gains? We explore three hypotheses. First, that there may be non-
learning benefits from private schools that motivate parents. Perhaps parents 
prioritize non-cognitive skills which are strongly associated with later-life 
outcomes (Deming, 2017), and which private schools instill. However we find no 
gains in a range of outcomes, including social awareness, self-management, 
aspirations, or growth mindset. Alternatively, parents may turn to private schools 
for non-educational attributes, such as access to a higher-status social network or 
physical amenities like textbooks and nicer classrooms, either as ends in 
themselves or signals of quality (Jacob et al., 2017; MacLeod and Urquiola, 
2015).16 We find no evidence that winning the lottery significantly changed 
pupils’ social networks, as measured by the composition of their five closest 
friends. Treated students did however attend schools with slightly better 
amenities, including a reduction in class size of three pupils. 
 
Rather than delivering higher quality—by whatever definition—the private 
sector may simply fill gaps in service provision where no public schooling is 
available (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2017). Consistent with this notion, evidence on 
private school enrollment decisions in rural Pakistan suggests distance matters 
enormously, with the probability of choosing a school falling more than 4.1 
percentage points per 500 meter increase (Carneiro, Das, & Reis, 2016). By 
contrast, the price elasticity is relatively low: just -0.5 for girls and -0.2 for boys. 
If lack of state provision drives private school demand in Delhi, we would expect 
voucher winners to attend schools closer to their homes than other students. 
                                      
16 (Rao, 2018) shows that reservations for marginalized students in Delhi classrooms significantly 
reduce prejudice among their more elite peers, consistent with the contact hypothesis. Here we 
focus on the marginalized students themselves 
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Our data show no such effect, and distance to school is unaffected by lottery 
status. 
 
Second, we present a simple conceptual framework that allows for richer and 
poorer parents to have different outside options. We might expect poorer children 
to go to low-quality, free government schools in the absence of vouchers. By 
contrast richer households might have otherwise gone to higher-cost and higher-
quality private schools. We do find evidence of heterogeneity in treatment effects. 
Students predicted to have high spending on school have large negative treatment 
effects as they are induced to switch to lower-cost, lower-quality schools. Students 
predicted to have very low spending on school by contrast have positive 
treatment effects. 
 
Third, an alternative explanation for our results is imperfect information. 
Parental demand may be based on limited or incorrect information about school 
quality. Ample evidence suggests school choices and student learning may be 
altered by provision of better information on relative school quality (Andrabi et 
al., 2017; Avitabile and de Hoyos, 2018), though results are not uniformly positive  
(Mizala & Urquiola, 2013). Our results reflect an environment where detailed 
information is lacking, and voucher-winning parents appear to change their minds 
about schools over time. Take-up of the vouchers was high in the first year, 
leading to a fifty percentage-point increase in the probability of attending a 
private school. But that gap declined by half by the fifth and final year of the 
program. A year after the program stopped, lottery winners were only five 
percentage-points more likely to enroll in private secondary schools. We also find 
evidence that initial school choice is more closely linked to raw test scores than 
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value-added. Take-up is more likely to fall over time when households initially 
choose private schools with larger class sizes and fewer desks. 
 
The following section describes the voucher lottery, designed to mimic policies 
mandated by—but often not enforced—under India’s RTE Act. Section 2.3 
describes our data, including the longitudinal tracking efforts over six years, the 
learning measurements, and other outcomes that we measured to explain sources 
of demand for private schooling. Section 2.4 presents the basic empirical 
specification and Section 2.5 reports our main results, starting with the basic 
intent-to-treat effects that are mostly zero for our primary outcomes, followed by 
pre-specified tests for heterogeneous effects and various robustness checks. 
Section 2.6 explores potential explanations for the null result. 
 
2.2 The voucher lottery 
 
The voucher program “Ensuring Access to Better Learning Experiences” 
(ENABLE), was administered by the UK-based charity Absolute Return for Kids 
(Ark) and the Centre for Civil Society. The experiment launched in the 2010-2011 
school year and provided vouchers to winning students for five years until the 
2015-2016 school year. The program operated in low-income neighborhoods in the 
East and North East districts of Delhi. 
 
The ENABLE program was designed to mimic and hence test the model of the 
nationwide Right to Education Act 2009 Section 12(1)(c). This federal policy 
mandates all private schools to reserve 25 percent of their places for economically 
and socially weaker sections of society, with government providing a per child 
reimbursement equivalent to either government per child spending or the school’s 
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fees, whichever is lower. The Act was challenged by private schools in the High 
Court and only began implementation in 2012, and even then only in some states. 
18 of 34 states and union territories have no schools participating. In Delhi, 48 
percent of private schools were participating in 2013/14 (Sarin et al., 2015). 
Overall government currently finances 600,000 places at private schools through 
the program. Entry to the program is only in Grade 1 but each cohort will be 
funded up to Grade 8, so the expectation is that the total number of supported 
students will reach eight million in equilibrium. 
 
A total of 1,776 eligible children applied for the program, of whom 1,618 were 
deemed eligible and ultimately entered the lottery. To qualify, students had to be 
aged between five and seven, from “economically weaker sections” (family income 
not exceeding Rs. 8,000 per month—about $129 U.S. dollars), and not already 
enrolled in a recognized private school (they could be either attending a 
government school, an unrecognized private school, or not enrolled at all.) Overall 
children in our sample are from households below average income and wealth. 
Average monthly per capita income in our sample is Rs. 1,584, compared to a 
Delhi average of Rs. 2,654 (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Comparing experimental sample to Delhi as a whole 
 
Note: Data for Delhi on Caste, television and fridge ownership, and mother’s education are from 
the 2015/16 Demographic and Health Survey. Data for Delhi on average income (Rupees) are 
from the 2010 (66th) National Sample Survey. Data for Delhi on household education spending 
(Rupees) is from the 2014-15 (71st) National Sample Survey. 
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A random number generator sequentially selected students to be treated, 
stratified by ward (wards are electoral units with an average population of around 
60,000 people. Students are drawn from 25 wards in East and North-East Delhi). 
If one sibling in a household won a voucher, all of their eligible siblings were also 
automatically awarded a voucher and withdrawn from the pool of unselected 
children, thus we cluster our errors at the household level. Students were selected 
sequentially until at least 50 percent of children in each ward were treated. This 
design meant that children with eligible siblings were slightly more likely to be in 
the treatment than the control group. In total 815 students were treated (50.4 
percent of the sample). 
 
Families of lottery winners were provided with a handbook listing all 105 schools 
and their address, principal, number of grades, average class size, medium of 
instruction, and toilet facilities. Parents were asked to rank their top five schools 
from the full list of 105 schools, with a second lottery held to assign students to 
schools if demand exceeded available places. In practice this was only necessary 
in a few cases, and the overwhelming majority (84 percent) of lottery winners 
were assigned to their first choice school. 
 
A total of 105 private schools enrolled in the program from a total of 389 private 
schools in the 25 experiment wards. There are also 337 public schools in these 
wards. Schools committed to accept any and all voucher winners who applied to 
their school with no discrimination, admissions test, or additional fees. Each 
voucher was worth up to Rs. 7,300 (around $117 U.S. dollars), redeemable for 
annual tuition fees (up to Rs. 4,800), two sets of uniform (2 vouchers of Rs. 300 
each), school textbooks (Rs. 900), and one meal per day (10 vouchers of Rs. 100 
  
72 
each). The fee level was set high enough that it would cover the fees at close to 
75 percent of private schools in the experiment location. All private schools were 
then invited to participate. The voucher amounts increased by around 10 percent 
per year to account for inflation. The value of the initial voucher was around 15 
percent of baseline household income. All participating schools charged fees at or 
below the Rs. 4,800 voucher level, and are in the low end of the fee distribution 
for private schools in Delhi. Average annual household spending on primary 
school in Delhi is more than twice the value of the voucher (Rs. 16,442 - MOSPI - 
NSSO, 2015). Average government spending per student in government schools is 
also twice as high as the ENABLE voucher (Rs. 14,615 - Pritchett and Aiyar, 
2014). Vouchers were personalized for each student, produced by Edenred, an 
international voucher service provider operating in 100 countries, and followed 
Reserve Bank of India guidelines including a number of security features to 
reduce any risk of misuse (see Figure A2.2). A census of schools conducted in the 
same part of Delhi (North Shahdara) in 2004 found average teacher salaries were 
Rs. 10,072 per month in government schools, compared to Rs. 3,627 in recognised 
private unaided schools (Tooley & Dixon, 2007). A 2014 survey of private schools 
in which ENABLE voucher winners were enrolled was conducted. The survey 
covered 87 schools with treatment students and 35 schools with control students. 
The mean number of students in these schools was 175, of whom 42 percent were 
female. The median teacher had 4 years of experience. Schools reported an equal 
number of lessons per week in Hindi, English, and Mathematics, averaging 6 
lessons of 35 minutes per week for each subject. Schools were allocated an average 
of 7 students each; by 2014 the number of voucher winners still at schools with 
voucher winning students had dropped to 5 per school. On entry this was around 
ten percent of the average grade one class of 68 students. 
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2.3 Data 
 
We combine data from our endline survey, administered six years after the start 
of the lottery, with the baseline survey of all students collected for (Wolf et al., 
2015), administrative data on initial school choices of treatment students, data on 
schools from a 2014 survey of treatment schools, and administrative data on 
schools from the District Information System for Education (DISE). 
 
For our endline survey we administered three survey instruments: one for lottery 
students, one for their guardian, and one for their sibling. The student instrument 
tests English, Hindi, and Mathematics skills, alongside a set of non-cognitive 
measures, including growth mindset, self-management, social-awareness, and 
aspirations, as well as life satisfaction, self-perception, and social networks. 
The English and Hindi assessments repeated items from the baseline survey 
allowing us to place the baseline and endline scores on the same scale and 
estimate absolute learning progress. At baseline, English and Hindi assessments 
were administered in an oral reading fluency format in which students simply 
read words aloud from a sequence. At endline, these same instruments were used 
along with a subset of publicly available items from the 2011 Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS). One set of these items was 
translated into Hindi. The PIRLS questions are focused on testing reading 
comprehension by asking students questions about a short story, and are aimed at 
Grade Four students. In addition we include mathematics items from the Andhra 
Pradesh Randomized Experiment Study allowing us to compare our results with 
those from that voucher study (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015). As 
(Tooley, 2016) notes, the Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) experiment 
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administered mathematics tests in the language of instruction, which varies 
systematically by school type. To minimize the risk of confounding school type 
and the language of testing, our mathematics instrument was presented side-by-
side in both English and Hindi to all students. Figure A2.3 provides an example 
mathematics question from the exam. Questions on aspirations were drawn from 
the Young Lives Round 4 survey questionnaire - specifically, students were asked 
to “Imagine you had no barriers and could study for as long as you liked, or go 
back to school if you have already left. What level of formal education would you 
like to complete?”. Parents were asked, “Ideally, how many total years of 
education would you like/expect your child to complete?”. Items on other non-
cognitive skills were drawn from the California CORE districts project (West, 
Buckley, Krachman, & Bookman, 2017), with four questions to measure each of 
the three concepts of grit, self-management, and social awareness. We measure 
life satisfaction using the Cantril Ladder, drawn from the Gallup World Poll, 
which we also adapted to ask about student satisfaction with their school. The 
sibling test was administered to the next youngest sibling who was present. In the 
case in which there were no younger siblings, the next oldest sibling was tested. 
Siblings were given the standard ASER Hindi and Mathematics assessments, 
which evaluate proficiency on a one to five scale. Siblings were also given an oral 
reading fluency test based on a list of English words. 
 
Endline data was collected during household visits by teams of two enumerators 
in two phases. Enumerators took the following steps to locate children: first, all 
phone numbers on record were dialed; second, all existing addresses on record 
were visited; third, neighbors of the family’s past addresses were asked for 
information for locating the family; and fourth, the school on record for the child 
was asked for information for locating the family. The first phase of endline data 
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collection took place in May and June 2017, tracking 1,304 of 1,618 children. The 
second phase was conducted between September and October 2017, tracking an 
additional 101 children, for an overall attrition rate of 13.2 percent. 
 
Baseline data was collected during household visits before the lottery was 
conducted by Wolf et al. (2015). Eligible students were given achievement tests in 
Hindi reading, English reading, and mathematics. Table 2.2 presents evidence on 
balance between treatment and control groups. Note we see statistically 
significant imbalance in age (with treatment pupils 1.5 months older on average) 
and on Hindi scores (where treatment pupils read 0.07 more words per minute). 
Inclusion or exclusion of baseline controls to adjust for this imbalance does not 
affect our main results. 
 
We link the schools from the ENABLE experiment to administrative data from 
India on school characteristics from the District Information System (DISE). We 
are able to match 90 percent of the schools who selected into the voucher 
program, and 92 percent of the schools to which students were ultimately 
allocated.  
 
Table 2.3 compares the private schools that were part of the ENABLE voucher 
program to other schools in the same village ID from the DISE data. Details on 
the variable construction can be found in Appendix A2.1. The DISE 
administrative data shows that schools enrolling voucher winners are on average 
smaller than non-participating private schools (253 students compared to 396). 
They have similar proportions of female and scheduled caste students, and 
similar levels of infrastructure and materials (books, water, toilets, playgrounds, 
and libraries). Private schools participating in the ENABLE program were, 
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however, less likely to be English medium (49 percent) than other private schools 
(72 percent). Across Delhi almost all government schools are taught in Hindi (94 
percent), and almost all private schools are English medium (86 percent) (ASER, 
2014). Although most private schools are advertised as English medium, in 
practice most lessons are taught in both Hindi and English, with teachers having 
a relatively poor command of English and primarily teaching through Hindi 
translations of an English language textbook (Endow, 2018; Bhattacharya, 2013). 
 
Table 2.2: Balance Test of Baseline Student Characteristics 
 
 
Note: This table shows t-tests among baseline variables between treatment and control groups as 
well as an F-test for joint significance. Standard errors are clustered at the household level, and 
ward fixed effects are used. 
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Table 2.3: Selection of Participating Private Schools 
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, *, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. This table shows descriptive 
statistics for the schools participating in the voucher experiment as compared to other public 
schools and non-participating private schools from the same neighborhoods in Delhi. Data comes 
from the 2011 “District Information System for Education” (DISE) database. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Student Outcomes 
 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for our main outcomes of interest. 
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2.4 Empirical Specification 
 
Following our pre-specified model, we estimate the intention-to-treat equation 
shown in equation 2.1, where yit is the student outcome, Ti is a dummy for the 
treatment variable, and Xi is a vector of student-level baseline covariates. These 
baseline covariates include age, gender, baseline monthly income, and a baseline 
asset index. Four students are missing baseline monthly income data. To avoid 
dropping these observations, we simply predict income for these four students 
using the baseline asset index. Calculations for multiple imputations show that 
one imputation has a 99.72 percent relative efficiency to an infinite number of 
imputations, thus we only take one draw from this prediction. We also include 
ward fixed effects to account for the randomization design, and a dummy 
indicating the endline tracking phase due to the fact that the data collection 
process spanned longer than expected. 
 
 yit=α+β1Ti+β2Xi+εi               (2.1) 
 
We also estimate the treatment-on-the-treated effect using a two-stage least 
squares instrumental variable regression specified in equations 2 and 3, using 
winning the lottery as an instrument for the portion of the six years of the 
experiment in which the child attended private school Pri. 
 
 Pri=γ+α1Ti+α2Xi+ϵi           (2.2) 
 
 yit=λ+β3𝑃𝑟i+β4Xi+θi           (2.3) 
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We are unable to distinguish between school quality and peer effects, but note 
that peer effects have been shown to be small relative to the effects of differences 
in pedagogy (Duflo et al., 2011). We use randomization statistical inference to 
test the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, reporting exact p-values in each 
table. Following Young (2019), we conduct 2000 draws to determine these 
estimates. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we use family-wise adjusted 
standard errors based on 10,000 draws following Westfall, Young, & Wright 
(1993) along pre-specified groupings. To address concerns regarding attrition, we 
report upper and lower bounds from Lee (2009) using student gender to tighten 
the estimates. Table 2.2 presents evidence that attrition did not impact the 
baseline balance of our sample. Attriters are though slightly more likely to be 
from the control group and from poorer households. Treatment students were 
seven percent more likely to be tracked, and students from one standard 
deviation higher baseline wealth were three percent more likely to be tracked 
(Table A2.3). 
 
For our primary outcome variables, we estimate an item response theory (IRT) 
model17 to generate test scores along three separate academic outcomes: 
mathematics, English, and Hindi. IRT models are standard in psychometrics and 
are increasingly common in the development and education literature in 
economics (see, for instance, (Das & Zajonc, 2010). We estimate hybrid models - 
two-parameter logistic models for single word reading, three-parameter models for 
the mathematics questions where a guessing parameter is appropriate, and a 
partial credit model for the PIRLS items with more than two possible scores. 
Details on the construction of other outcome variables can be found in Appendix 
section A2.1. 
                                      
17 See Appendix section A2.2 for details of the IRT modeling 
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Intent-to-treat estimates - Effect of winning a voucher 
 
Our main results are presented in Table 2.5. Winning the voucher lottery lowers 
Hindi scores by 0.09 standard deviations, while English and mathematics scores 
are unaffected. Decomposing the effect on Hindi, we find no effect on reading 
comprehension, and a reduction in oral reading fluency equivalent to 4 words 
(from a control group mean of 47 out of 100 words). 
 
Table 2.5: Voucher Impacts on Academic Learning 
 
 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows the impact of winning the voucher lottery on the primary academic 
learning outcomes. Each outcome is standardised to the control group. The mathematics 
score is estimated using a three parameter logistic model. The English and Hindi scores are 
estimated using hybrid item response theory models. Two parameter logistic models are 
used for the oral reading fluency words, three parameter logistic models are estimated for 
the dichotomous PIRLS items, and general partial credit models are used for the remaining 
PIRLS items. Further details on the construction of the outcome variables can be found in 
Appendix A2.1. Upper and lower bounds from Lee (2009) are reported using student gender 
to tighten the estimates. Exact p-values show randomization tests based on 2000 draws. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level, and all results include an endline phase 
dummy and ward fixed effects. 
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Figure 2.1 presents these results visually using kernel density plots. Student Hindi 
and English performance has a bimodal distribution, highlighting that some 
students still simply cannot read. One limitation of controlling for the baseline 
test scores— particularly for Hindi and English—is that because most students 
could not read at the beginning of the experiment, there is little variation in test 
scores at the bottom of the distribution. Specifically, 75 percent of students could 
not read a single Hindi word at baseline, and 84 percent could not read a single 
English word. 
 
Figure 2.1: Voucher Impacts on Key Education Outcomes 
 
Note: Figures a, b, and c, show the distribution of endline scores for Hindi, English and 
mathematics, respectively. Solid lines show the treatment group, and dashed lines show the 
control group. Zero on the x-axis is equivalent to the control group mean. Figure d shows the 
portion of treatment and control students who attended private school in each given year. The 
vertical dashed line marks the end of the ENABLE voucher program. 
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2.5.2 Instrumental variable estimates - Effect of Attending Private 
School 
 
Next we use the lottery as an instrument for private school attendance. We first 
note that winning a voucher has a strong effect on private school attendance—
more than doubling the amount of time spent at a private school. The voucher 
increased the portion of the six years between baseline and endline survey spent 
at a private 
 
Table 2.6: Private School Impacts on Academic Learning: IV Results 
 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of private schooling 
on test outcomes. We instrument for the endogenous portion of years in private school using 
the lottery winner status. Column 1 shows the impact of winning the lottery on the portion 
of years in private school. Each outcome is standardised to the control group. The 
mathematics score is estimated using a three parameter logistic model. The English and 
Hindi scores are estimated using hybrid item response theory models. Two parameter logistic 
models are used for the oral reading fluency words, three parameter logistic models are 
estimated for the dichotomous PIRLS items, and general partial credit models are used for 
the remaining PIRLS items. Further details on the construction of the outcome variables can 
be found in Appendix A2.1. Exact p-values show randomization tests based on 2000 draws. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level, and all results include an endline phase 
dummy and ward fixed effects. 
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school by 34 percentage points (from a control group mean of 30.5 percent). 
Though compliance is imperfect, the first stage is strong. The core results on 
academic outcomes are reported in Table 2.6. The coefficient in Column 4 implies 
that moving from zero years in a private school to six years reduces Hindi 
performance by 0.3 standard deviations, with no statistically significant impact 
on mathematics or English. The effect sizes are similar to those from estimates 
without the pre-specified controls. The results are robust to looking at raw test 
scores (not shown) in lieu of the IRT scaled scores. 
 
Our results contrast somewhat with those found by earlier studies, which 
generally found positive or null results. In particular Wolf et al. (2015) analysis of 
two-year data from the same experiment found positive effects for all subjects, 
which were statistically significant only for English (Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7: Comparison of estimated private school effects from our study with 
previous studies 
 
Note: This table presents a comparison of the estimated private school effects from our 
study with those from previous studies, including those from Wolf et al. (2015) on the 
same experiment that we study, after two years, from (Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman, 2015) on a similar voucher experiment in rural Andhra Pradesh, and 
from (Singh, 2015) using a value-added model with data from urban Andhra Pradesh. 
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2.5.3 Robustness 
 
Why might private schools lead to no improvement in outcomes? First, we note 
that we can rule out that our results are driven by substitution away of parental 
effort, as has been documented in other contexts (Das, Dercon, Habyarimana, & 
Krishnan, 2007). We see no change in parent spending or time input due to the 
voucher (Table 2.8). 
 
Second, winning the voucher lottery could also have direct self-confidence or 
psychological incentive effects. Such effects would bias our estimates upwards not 
down, and in any case we have direct measures of self-confidence, finding little 
effect (Table 2.8). 
 
2.6 Understanding School Choice: Why is Demand So High When 
Average Impacts Are So Low? 
 
Up to this point, our results present something of a paradox: a majority of 
households in urban Indian pay to send their children to private school. The offer 
of private-school vouchers in East Delhi generated excess demand, leading to a 
lottery system to ration the places. Yet we find no average impact on test scores 
or most other non-learning outcomes. Why is demand so high for vouchers if 
returns to private schooling are so low? 
 
Given our main result finding negative or null effects of attending private schools 
on learning, we investigate three possible explanations for this finding. First, that 
there may be other non-learning benefits from attending private schools, second 
that returns vary for different groups depending on what their outside option was, 
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and third that parents face an information asymmetry and incorrectly believe 
private schools to be better than they are in terms of learning. 
 
2.6.1 Testing for Non-Learning Benefits 
 
First, does private school enrollment yield gains in terms of other outcomes pre-
viously held to drive school choice? When parents and students engage in school 
choice, they are typically maximising over a set of attributes which may include 
learning and teaching quality, but also reputational concerns, peer quality, and 
other amenities (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015). 
 
For the most part, results are equally underwhelming as in the case of academic 
outcomes. Looking at non-academic student outcomes, we document no impact of 
winning the lottery on important non-cognitive outcomes including social 
awareness, growth mindset, or self-confidence (Table 2.8). Social networks also 
seem to be unaffected by the voucher. The composition of students friendship 
groups is also unaffected. We find no evidence of voucher impact on teacher 
absenteeism or on the practice of corporal punishment in the classroom. We do 
not document any differences in beliefs about child ability from the voucher. 
Winning the lottery had no impact on parental expectations of that child’s future 
earnings, expected educational achievement, or probability of working in the 
formal sector. The voucher had no spillovers on other family members academic 
performance, and in particular, non-participating siblings of voucher winners are 
no more likely to attend private school (siblings of lottery winners were eligible to 
also receive vouchers only if they were aged 5-7 years at baseline). If anything, 
survey responses suggest that receiving a voucher improves parental opinions 
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about the government’s capability to provide high quality education in 
government schools. 
 
We are unable to test with our data the perception that private schooling may 
improve prospects in the marriage market (Srivastava, 2006), that private schools 
may improve spoken English if not reading, and that there may be labour market 
returns to private school attendance and spoken English proficiency (Asadullah, 
2009; Azam et al., 2013; Chakraborty and Bakshi, 2016). 
  
88 
Table 2.8: ITT effects on other student, school, and family outcomes 
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Note: Each row shows the ITT effect of winning a voucher on a separate outcome 
variable. Upper and lower bounds from Lee (2009) are reported using student 
gender to tighten the estimates. Exact p-values show randomization tests based on 
2000 draws. Standard errors are clustered at the household level, and all results 
include an endline survey-round dummy and ward fixed effects. 
 
2.6.2 Heterogeneous Effects: Impacts May Vary by Outside Options 
 
In this section, we explore the possibility that tension between high demand and 
low average impact can be explained by heterogeneity in household’s outside 
options. We begin by laying out a simple conceptual framework that 
demonstrates how school choice in the face of a voucher for low-cost private 
schools may yield null impacts on learning even if the quality of these schools is 
superior to government schools. This argument motivates estimation of a specific 
form of heterogeneous effects in terms of both take-up and voucher impacts. 
 
 
  
91 
Conceptual framework 
 
 
Suppose households select a school to maximize utility as a function of school 
quality and other consumption, U(Qj,C) subject to a budget constraint defined by 
their wealth, W. They choose from three types of schools, j ∈ {g,l,e}: free 
government schools, g; low-cost private schools that (by hypothesis) provide at 
least minimally higher quality, l; and elite schools that provide higher quality at 
yet higher cost, e. In short, qualities and prices are ranked such that Qg < Ql < 
Qe and 0 = Pg < Pl < Pe. With standard assumptions on the shape of the utility 
function, the poorest households will opt for government schools, the richest into 
elite private schools, and some intermediate households will send their children to 
low-cost private schools. 
 
In this simple setup, the introduction of a voucher that sets Pl = 0 will induce 
poor households to switch from government to low-cost private schools, with 
some improvement in education quality. In addition, however, vouchers will 
induce some wealthy households to switch from elite schools into lower-quality 
low-cost private schools. 
 
The implication for the empirical analysis is that if quality and price of school 
types are ranked in the way we posit here, we should find that (i) the take-up of 
vouchers is declining in wealth, (ii) the poorest households who spend the least on 
private education in the absence of a voucher obtain the largest academic benefits 
from their introduction, and (iii) some wealthier households who are likely to send 
their children to elite schools otherwise, may suffer negative impacts on academic 
outcomes from the introduction of the voucher. 
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Heterogeneous Effects by expected spending on school 
 
First, using data from the control group, we estimate the amount spent on 
schooling ˆyi as a function of baseline covariates, Xi, including household income, 
wealth, religion, caste, and the child’s age, gender, and baseline test scores. We 
then use these covariates to predict expected spending on school for the 
treatment group. 
 
 yi=µ + ϕXi+ui                 (2.4) 
 
We predict yi using Ordinary Least Squares, and five different machine learning 
algorithms; LASSO, Random Forest, BOOST, Support Vector Machines, and 
Kernel-Based Regularized Least Squares (KRLS). By far the best performing 
predictor is the Random Forest, with an out of sample R-squared of .286, 
compared to an R-squared of .128 for Boost (second best) and .051 for OLS (see 
Table A2.4).18 Selecting the random forest estimator as the best predictor of 
actual spending, we then categorise children into three groups based on their 
predicted spending. For students in the control group who never attended a 
private school, median spending was 2,500 rupees. We therefore assign anyone in 
either treatment or control group with predicted spending below 2,500 to be in 
the free government school group. Anyone with predicted spending above the 
7,300 rupees that is the maximum value of the ENABLE voucher is assigned to 
the elite private school group. The remaining students are assigned as those who 
might have attended a similar low-cost private school anyway. There are 1,054 
children in the predicted free government school group (65 percent), 136 children 
                                      
18 This ordering is consistent with (Mullainathan & Spiess, 2017) 
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in the predicted low-cost private school group (8 percent), and 428 children in the 
predicted higher-cost private school group (26 percent). 
 
Next, we test for heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the indicator for 
winning the lottery with each child’s predicted school type from equation (4). 
 
 yit=α+β1Ti+β2Ti×Pr⁡(Gov)i+β3Ti×Pr⁡(Elite)i+β4Xit-1+εi      (2.5) 
 
The results of this analysis is consistent with the conceptual framework - we see 
some negative treatment effects for those predicted to attend a higher fee private 
school, and some positive effects for those predicted to attend free government 
schools. 
  
94 
 
Table 2.9: Heterogeneous Voucher Impacts 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows heterogeneous ITT effects of winning the voucher lottery on voucher 
take-up, school quality measures, and the primary academic learning outcomes. Each outcome 
is standardised to the control group. The mathematics score is estimated using a three 
parameter logistic model. The English and Hindi scores are estimated using hybrid item 
response theory models. Two parameter logistic models are used for the oral reading fluency 
words, three parameter logistic models are estimated for the dichotomous PIRLS items, and 
general partial credit models are used for the remaining PIRLS items. Further details on the 
construction of the outcome variables can be found in Appendix A2.1. Exact p-values show 
randomization tests based on 2000 draws. Standard errors are clustered at the household level, 
and all results include an endline phase dummy and ward fixed effects. 
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Figure 2.2: Mean outcomes by Predicted School Type 
Note: Figure shows average endline test scores for the three groups of predicted school type. 
 
2.6.3 Asymmetric information 
 
Our third hypothesis is that parents can’t observe true school quality (value-
added), and at best observe average test scores or peer quality and indicators of 
school infrastructure (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018). This theory is 
consistent with evidence from various contexts showing that providing parents 
with information about comparative school performance improves choices 
(Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Andrabi et al., 2017; Afridi et al., 2018). First, we 
compare estimates of school test scores and value-added with parental 
preferences. 
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We estimate the quality of schools that voucher winners selected based on their 
value-added. We incorporate school fixed effects into equation 2.1. We do this in 
two ways. First, we interact treatment with the school allocated in the lottery. 
Second, we additionally scale these coefficients by the number of years the student 
actually attended the school. 
 
Given the small sample sizes for some of these schools, we risk estimating 
particularly extreme value-added when the estimation error is high. To address 
this bias-variance tradeoff, we implement an Empirical Bayes shrinkage estimator 
from Morris (1983) that has become common in the education and health 
literature. Following the procedure of Chandra et al. (2016), we shrink the school 
value-added estimates toward the mean of the true distribution. Further details 
are discussed in Appendix A2.3. Since most students were allocated to their first-
choice school, we do not have enough observations to use the “overflow” students 
to causally estimate the marginal returns to a given school. Most school-choice in 
this context is determined by location, so our specification relies on the 
assumption that conditional on the neighborhood fixed effects, household income 
and wealth, gender, and age controls that we use, the allocation of one private 
school versus another is based on idiosyncratic variation in the geographic 
distribution of students and households that is orthogonal to value-added. 
 
We use data on parental preferences from their ranking of schools. All lottery 
winners were asked to rank their top five schools from the full list of 105 schools. 
Whilst estimates are imprecise due to the small number of schools (78), we do 
show that the relationship between parent rankings and average test scores is 
much stronger (R2 = 0.087) than the relationship between preferences and school 
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value-added (R2 = 0.006). Other school characteristics are not statistically 
significantly correlated with school rankings. 
 
Table 2.10: School Quality and Parental Preferences 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows the correlation between parental preferences and school characteristics. 
The dependent variable in each case is the mean rank for each school given by parents of 
treatment students following the initial lottery. Each parent was asked to rank their top 5 
school choices from the full list of 105 schools. 1 is the best rank and 5 is the worst. Standard 
errors are clustered at the school level. 
 
 
Second, if we expect parents to learn more about true (lower than expected) 
quality over time, we would expect voucher take-up to decline over time, and to 
decline the most for those in the weakest voucher schools. Figure A2.1 shows 
these trends separated by wealth tertile—which are dramatic. Take-up fell steeply 
from more than three quarters in the first year to 41 percent in year five. As 
Figure 2.1d has shown already, take-up falls at a similar rate for treatment and 
control students. Richer households had lower voucher take-up overall, though 
parents across the wealth distribution tended to abandon the voucher program at 
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a similar rate. The rapid convergence in year six is most likely due to budget 
constrained households being unable to afford private schools, though we cannot 
distinguish that effect from adjustments stemming from learning about school 
quality. 
 
To further understand the reasons for moving from private to public schools, we 
estimate which baseline characteristics correlate with remaining in private school 
at endline. Overall one third of students who were in a private school at the start 
of the programme had moved to a public school by the end (including both 
treatment and control students). By contrast, just five percent of students who 
started in a public school ended in a private school (Table A2.5). 
 
Unsurprisingly, those we predict (based on baseline student characteristics) to 
spend the most on school, are more likely to be in private school at endline, 
whether they started in government or private school. For those who started in 
private schools, choosing a school with larger class sizes or without desks is 
associated with being less likely to remain in private school. For those who 
started in a government school, satisfaction with the initial school is associated 
with being less likely to be in private school at endline. Average school test scores 
and distance from home to school are not correlated with endline private school 
enrolment for either group (Table 2.11). This is somewhat consistent with the 
theory that parents do not perfectly observe school quality ex ante, but do gain 
information over time, though neither raw test scores nor value-added are 
associated with endline take-up. 
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Thirdly, Table 2.8 shows that on key visible inputs—specifically, classroom desks 
and class size—voucher recipients did see modest but statistically significant gains 
over control. 
 
This raises the possibility that parents overestimate the importance of these 
inputs, or confuse correlation and causation when assessing the learning outcomes 
implied by private education. They could be forgiven, as our data suggest 
common methods to estimate private school effects using non-experimental data 
significantly overstate the returns in this context. Specifically, we compare 
estimated private school effects using an OLS-model with contemporaneous 
covariates for family background, a value-added model using baseline student test 
scores, and lower bounds on these estimates accounting for selection on 
unobservables proportional to the estimated selection on observable covariates as 
suggested by (Oster, 2016). All three methods produce positive estimates (Figure 
A2.4), and for the case of English and Hindi – but not mathematics – the non-
experimental estimates fall outside the 95% confidence interval of our 
experimental estimates. 
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Table 2.11: Correlates of Remaining in Private School at Endline 
 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows which baseline student and school characteristics correlate with 
remaining in private at endline. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
We estimate the impacts of a voucher lottery for low-cost private schools among 
poor households in Delhi, shedding light on the likely effects of a sea change in 
education in urban India. We show that receiving a voucher for five years of 
private schooling lowered Hindi scores, with no impacts on mathematics or 
English. Examining alternative drivers of the high demand for private schooling, 
we provide evidence against several common hypotheses: parents do not use 
vouchers to enroll students in schools closer to home, they do not choose schools 
that generate greater non-cognitive skills or lower corporal punishment, they 
experience only slightly improved classroom facilities, and no discernible change 
in social networks. Among voucher winners, private school enrollment declined 
significantly over time, and particularly for those who chose schools with large 
class sizes. This is consistent with the notion that school quality is unobservable 
ex ante, but parents learn about quality over time. We find some evidence that 
the null effects can be explained by substantial heterogeneity. Those who would 
have otherwise attended a free government school do see some positive impacts, 
and those who would otherwise have attended a higher-cost private school see 
larger negative impacts. 
 
A key question in evaluating our results across various dimensions is whether 
they constitute an informative null result, or leave open the possibility of 
economically significant returns. Although we improve substantially on the 29 
percent attrition observed at the two-year follow-up survey (Wolf et al., 2015), 
our attrition rate of 13 percent is nonetheless less than ideal and limits our ability 
to rule-out some positive effects. As in any experiment of this kind, we can only 
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speak to the impacts on compliers, and cannot rule out the possibility that 
students already enrolled in private schools (‘always-takers’) experience higher 
returns. Our sample and therefore focus includes only low-cost private schools in 
one neighborhood of Delhi. Future research could usefully test our findings in 
other settings, as suggested by at least some observational data analysis (Moore, 
2017). Our focus is also only on voucher students and not on other remaining 
students in government schools (studied by Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 
2015) or on prior students in private schools (studied by Rao, 2018). We are not 
able to comment on whether voucher students may face discrimination, making 
their results unrepresentative of other students in low-cost private schools. 
 
What implications do our results have for the continued government scale-up the 
Right to Education Act Section 12(1)(c)? Though the policy was designed to give 
low-income students access to better quality private schools, our results suggest 
that a large proportion of lower-fee private schools fail to provide such quality. 
From a policy perspective, however, it bears noting that schools in our sample 
generate roughly equivalent learning at a per pupil expenditure that is roughly 
half of nearby government schools. Whether the expansion of government-funded 
places in low-cost private schools leads government to reduce spending on 
government schools, or what the equilibrium effects of such a policy might be, 
remain open questions. 
 
There are also important differences between the voucher experiment evaluated in 
this study and the RTE policy. First, the RTE policy reserves 25 percent of seats 
in private schools for eligible low-income students. In none of the schools in our 
experiment did the voucher children take up this many seats. Second, the schools 
in our experiment were able to expand their number of places without turning 
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away any other fee-paying students, which might not be the case for all schools. 
Allende, Gallego, & Neilson (2019) for example highlight the importance of 
supply response in determining the aggregate welfare implications of school 
choice. Third, the relatively small number of vouchers funded through our 
experiment means that there are unlikely to have been substantial spillover 
effects on students left behind in government schools (as for example considered 
by Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015). This could be an important mechanism 
in the policy at scale. Overall, the precise design of the RTE policy is left to 
individual states and therefore has substantial variation. Our study speaks most 
directly to inferences about the overall existing quality of low-cost urban private 
schools, rather than to possible broader or general equilibrium effects.  
 
Government also bears some duty to students who attend private schools through 
entirely private finance. Given our results consistent with imperfect information, 
a plausible role for government could be providing the public good of better 
information about school quality, as has shown to be effective at improving private 
school quality in the US (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008), India (Afridi et al., 2018) 
and Pakistan (Andrabi et al., 2017), or focusing on private school market failures in 
other areas (Andrabi, Das, & Khwaja, 2015). Since our endline survey, the South 
Delhi government has announced that government schools will shift to English 
medium–a move provoked by the popularity of English-medium private schools.19 
The evidence presented here suggests that this change may have little effect on 
the English reading ability of students in government schools. 
                                      
19 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/south-corp-schools-to-
teach-in-english/articleshow/59905602.cms 
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Appendix A2.1: Variable Construction 
 
The construction of our outcome variables follows the methods pre-specified 
before the endline results were collected. Table notes include descriptions of many 
variables. Total education expenditure is the sum of the amount spent on tuition 
fees, uniforms, textbooks and school materials, transportation to school, other 
school fees, and private tuition. 
 
The non-cognitive outcomes in Table 2.8 were calculated based on the first 
component of principal component analyses (PCA) of a series of Likert scale 
questions. Students chose among completely true, mostly true, somewhat true, a 
little true, and not true at all. The growth mindset variable is based on: “My 
intelligence is something that I can’t change very much”; “Challenging myself 
won’t make me any smarter”; “There are some thing I am not capable of 
learning”; and “If I am not naturally smart in a subject, I will never do well in 
it.” Similarly, the self-management variable is based on: “I get distracted easily”; 
“I refuse things that are bad for me, even if they are fun”; “I do thinks that feel 
good in the moment but regret later on”; and “Sometimes I can’t stop myself 
from doing something, even if I know it is wrong.” Student responses to “I refuse 
things that are bad for me...” were reversed before the PCA was conducted. 
Social awareness was based on the following: “I get along with students who are 
different from me”; “When others disagree with me, I am respectful of their 
views”; “I can disagree with others without starting an argument”; “I care a lot 
about other students feelings.” 
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The political economy beliefs in Table 2.8 were constructed by the same 
method. The options for parents included strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, and disagree. The government capability index is 
constructed from “The government is capable of delivering high quality 
education” and “The public school that is closest to your home is a good 
school.” The government education duty index is based on “The government 
has a duty to provide free high quality education to everyone” and the inverse 
of “Parents should take more responsibility to ensure that their children get a 
high quality education.” The government economy duty index is formed from 
“When it comes to the economy, the government has a duty to ensure that 
everyone has a job” and the inverse of “When it comes to the economy, people 
should take responsibility to ensure that they find themselves a job.” 
 
We constructed school-characteristic variables from the DISE data. 
  
106 
Appendix A2.2: Item Response Theory Models 
 
We estimate test scores using techniques from Item Response Theory. Let i index 
students and j index items (test questions.) The English and Hindi oral reading 
fluency (ORF) assessments—word lists which do not have multiple choice 
options—lend themselves to a two-parameter logistic model (2PL) as shown in 
equation 2.6. The mathematics assessment, by contrast, includes multiple choice 
options, so we expand the model to a three-parameter one (3PL) by adding a 
guessing parameter cj as shown in equation 2.7. For the polytomous items from 
the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), we scale scores 
with a generalized partial credit model (GPCM) using equation 2.8, where li is 
student i’s grade on a scale with mj categories (in our case, mj = 3.) To construct 
the primary outcome variables in our specification, we use a hybrid model of 2PL, 
3PL, and GPCM, producing a single Bi for each student. We estimate a 2PL 
model for the English ORF items administered to siblings.  
 
 
  
(2.6) 
  
(2.7) 
 
(2.8) 
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Appendix A2.3: Heterogeneous effects by gender 
 
On average, girls score higher in both English and Hindi than boys, but unlike 
Wolf et al. (2015) who found larger positive effects for girls, we do not observe 
any differential treatment impacts by gender on our main learning outcomes, or 
on the likelihood of attending a private school (Table A2.1). We do though see 
differential impacts by gender for our main non-cognitive outcomes. Male lottery 
winners see substantially worse results (than male control students) for growth 
mindset, self-management, social awareness, and self-confidence (self-perceived 
skill rank in Mathematics), but higher life satisfaction (by 0.4 points on a 1 - 10 
Cantril ladder). Female lottery winners see none of these changes (Table A2.2). 
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Table A2.1: Heterogeneous Voucher Impacts on Academic Learning by Gender 
 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows the impact of winning the voucher lottery on the primary 
academic learning outcomes. Each outcome is standardised to the control group. The 
mathematics score is estimated using a three parameter logistic model. The English and 
Hindi scores are estimated using hybrid item response theory models. Two parameter 
logistic models are used for the oral reading fluency words, three parameter logistic models 
are estimated for the dichotomous PIRLS items, and general partial credit models are 
used for the remaining PIRLS items. Further details on the construction of the outcome 
variables can be found in Appendix A2.2. Upper and lower bounds from Lee (2009) are 
reported using student gender to tighten the estimates. Exact p-values show 
randomization tests based on 2000 draws. Standard errors are clustered at the household 
level, and all results include an endline phase dummy and ward fixed effects. 
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Table A2.2: Heterogeneous Voucher Impacts on Non-Cognitive Student Outcomes 
by Gender 
  
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Note: This table shows 
the impact of winning the voucher lottery on non-cognitive student outcomes. The growth mindset, 
social awareness, and self-management outcomes are principal component analysis results of a series of 
questions, detailed further in Appendix A2.1. The mathematics, Hindi, and English self ranks are 
students’ responses to, “Consider other students like you who are the same age and who live in the same 
place as you. If you were ranked against 100 students from this group based on your 
[mathematics/Hindi/English] ability, where would you rank? (where 1 is the best and 100 is the worst)” 
Upper and lower bounds from Lee (2009) are reported using student gender to tighten the estimates. 
Exact p-values show randomization tests based on 2000 draws. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level, and all results include an endline phase dummy and ward fixed effects.
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Appendix A2.4: Additional Figures 
 
Figure A2.1: Voucher Take-Up by Wealth Tertile 
 
Note: Figure A2 1 shows average voucher take up over time among lottery winners separated 
into three wealth tertiles constructed from the first principal component of baseline assets 
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Figure A2.2: ENABLE Vouchers 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the vouchers distributed to lottery winners. 
 
 
 
Figure A2.3: Sample Math Question 
 
 
Note: This figure shows a sample mathematics question administered to the students at endline. 
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Figure A2.4: Diminishing Private School Effects 
 
Note: These figures show estimated private school effects in 1) a model with no controls, 2) 
with baseline controls for age, sex, and family wealth, 3) with baseline controls for age, sex, 
family wealth, and test scores, 4) With selection on unobservables proportional to estimated 
selection on observables, 5) instrumental variable estimates using voucher assignment for 
experimental variation in private school attendance. 
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Appendix A2.5: Additional Tables 
 
Table A2.3: Predictors of Attrition 
 
 
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ** * p <0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note: This table shows which baseline characteristics correlate with being tracked in the endline 
survey. Standard errors are clustered at the household level, and the model includes ward fixed 
effects 
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Table A2.4: Performance of algorithms in predicting school spending 
Note: This table presents the R-squared from bivariate regressions of the actual value of average 
household spending on school, on the predicted value. Covariates used to predict average 
spending are student age, sex, baseline household income and wealth, baseline test scores, 
religion, caste, parental education, and survey tracking phase. 
Table A2.5: Movement between school types over 5 years 
Note: This table categorises all students according to the school type they started in Year 1 of 
the program and ended in Year 5 of the program. 
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Chapter 3: Contracting Out Schools at Scale: Evidence from 
Pakistan 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Private school enrolment in low- and middle-income countries more than doubled 
between 2000 and 2015. This represents growth of five percent per year 
(compared to 0.2 percent per year in government schools).20 Though private 
schools may offer some benefits over government schools, they are typically not 
accessible to the poorest due to higher fees. Some governments have decided to 
use public finance to allow poor students to get the (perceived) benefits of private 
schools. 
 
Can public-private partnerships (PPPs) provide equitable access to cost-effective 
privately managed schools? And if so what type of arrangements are most 
effective? One distinction is between public schools that are privately managed 
(such as US Charter schools or UK Academies), and private schools that receive 
public funds through a subsidy or voucher programme. Evidence from high-
income countries suggests that privately-managed public schools are more 
promising than vouchers for private schools (Epple et al., 2017; Epple et al., 
2016). In developing countries the evidence is more positive on vouchers and 
subsidies (Aslam et al., 2017; Shakeel et al., 2016), but there are far fewer studies. 
As yet there is no rigorous study on a large-scale charter-style public school 
                                      
20 World Bank World Development Indicators 
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management programme in a low or middle-income country. This matters as we 
might not expect findings from high income contexts to hold in lower-income 
countries in which the capacity of the state to provide effective procurement and 
regulation are likely to be particularly low. One study looks at the Partnership 
Schools for Liberia (PSL) pilot that involved 93 schools in its first year. A 
randomised evaluation found positive effects on learning, but with high and 
potentially unsustainable costs, and from a sample of schools that were relatively 
easier to access than the average school in the country (Romero, Sandefur, & 
Sandholtz, 2017). Two studies have looked at the Colombia Colegios en 
Concesión (CEC) programme that involved 25 schools in Bogotá. Both suggest 
that these schools do outperform traditional public schools in test scores, driven 
by a longer school day (Bonilla-Angel, 2011; Termes et al., 2015). Another study 
looks at the ‘Adopt a School’ programme in Pakistan, a precursor of the 
programme I study in this paper. This programme involved around 1,000 schools 
in Punjab and 500 schools in Sindh. The study though presents only descriptive 
analysis without making claims for causal inference (Malik et al 2015). In high-
income countries, there is a larger literature on similar programmes, which have 
grown to a total of 7,000 charter schools in the US over 26 years (D. Epple et al., 
2016), and around 5,000 academies in the UK over 16 years (Eyles, Machin, & 
McNally, 2017).  
 
In this study we provide the first estimates of a large-scale “contract 
management” public-private partnership in a developing country. The Punjab 
Public School Support Programme (PSSP) involved the largest ever contracting 
out of government schools to private management in a single year. Management 
of 4,276 “failing” government schools was contracted out to a range of non-profit 
educational organisations and experienced individuals. The introduction of the 
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programme coincided with a four percent year on year increase in total school 
enrolment in the province, or more than 450,000 students. This includes an 
increase of 57,514 students in the first converted schools, which represents an 
increase of 78 percent. We estimate the effect of school conversion on enrolment 
and test scores with a difference-in-difference estimator, comparing early 
converters to later converters. We find a large increase in enrolment relative to 
comparison schools. This increase is concentrated in Katchi grade (Kindergarten), 
suggestive of new enrolment of previously out of school children. Due to the large 
change in the composition of students in schools, and the short time frame within 
which test scores are measured, we do not necessarily expect to see any change in 
test scores. Test scores decline after conversion, though we are also less confident 
in this result as prior trends are not parallel. We present some evidence that the 
drop in exam scores may be due to the entry of new lower performing students. 
For schools that did not increase their number of exam candidates, there was no 
change in test scores. 
 
3.2 Schools in Punjab 
 
Punjab is the largest of the four provinces in Pakistan, with a population of 110 
million people. Education service delivery is largely decentralised from the federal 
government to the provincial governments. Like many low- and middle-income 
countries, Pakistan faces a learning crisis. Nearly half (43 percent) of Grade 3 
children in rural Punjab are unable to read a sentence in Urdu aimed at Grade 2 
students (ASER Pakistan, 2017). Only 73 percent of primary-aged children (6-10 
years old) are in primary school, with a further 11 percent in pre-primary and 16 
percent never having attended any kind of school (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Enrolment by Class, Thousands, Children Aged 6-10, Punjab 
 Government 
School 
Non-State 
School 
Total Percentage 
Never attended   1,926  0.16 
Less than 1 626 671 1,297 0.11 
Class 1 1,541 1,258 2,799 0.23 
Class 2 1,311 1,014 2,324 0.19 
Class 3 941 804 1,745 0.14 
Class 4 602 499 1,100 0.09 
Class 5 313 326 639 0.05 
Class 1 - 5 4,707 3,901 8,608 0.71 
Class 6 + 130 128 258 0.02 
Total   12,088 1.00 
Note: Data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2014-15 
 
Private schooling began to expand in Pakistan in the 1990s – the share of private 
schooling in total enrolment doubled from 15 to 30 percent between 1991 and 
2001 (Andrabi, Das, & Khwaja, 2008), and continued to rise through 2011 
(Figure 3.1). Teachers at private schools are more likely to be female, paid less 
than government teachers, and have less security of tenure (Andrabi et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 3.1: Private school participation rate age 6–10, 1998-2011 
 
Source: (Nguyen & Raju, 2014) 
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Pakistan also has a long history of government engagement with the non-state 
sector in education. The federal education policy of 1972 declared “education will 
be made free and universal up to Class X [Ten] for all children throughout the 
country ... in both Government and privately-managed schools. Private schools 
will be suitably supported for the loss of fees incurred by them” (Bengali, 1999). 
This position was repeated in 1992 when a new policy “declared the State's intent 
for emphasizing the private sector's role in education through “viable 
partnership[s]” … and reiterated strongly in 2001: “Acknowledging the shift in 
government's role from being a provider to a facilitator […] it is vital to rethink 
the parameters of public private partnership in the provision of education” 
(Malik, Bari, Muzaﬀar, & Khan, 2015). More recently the 2017 National 
Education Policy has outlined specific objectives to “encourage, facilitate and 
regulate private sector education” and to “promote regulated and monitored 
Public-Private Partnership[s] for educational development.” The policy also 
recommends that “Innovative programmes such as “Adopt a School” programme 
shall be continued” (Government of Pakistan Ministry of Federal Education and 
Professional Training, 2017). 
 
Most Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Pakistan have been either subsidies 
for private schools to enable them to accept pupils at reduced cost, or vouchers 
provided to students to enable them to pay the fees at private schools. More 
recently provincial governments have begun to explore ‘contract management’ 
PPPs similar to US Charter schools, in which private organisations are contracted 
to take over the management and operations of existing public schools, which 
remain government owned, financed, and regulated. 
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Education PPPs in Punjab are managed by the Punjab Education Foundation 
(PEF), itself a quasi-independent body. PEF was established in 1991, and made 
autonomous in 2004. PEF has three main programmes of support for private 
schools, all of which have grown over the past decade. The largest programme is 
the Foundation Assisted Schools, through which 1.9 million children are educated 
in registered private schools, with fees paid by PEF. The Education Voucher 
Scheme supports 500,000 children. PEF also has a New School Programme, which 
has contracted private organisations to build around 2,000 schools in remote and 
under-served areas, which have enrolled 250,000 students.  
 
Figure 3.2: Trends in PEF-supported Schools 
 
 
Note: All data is from Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) Annual Reports. Real spending is 
calculated using World Bank Consumer Price Inflation. FAS is the acronym for “Foundation 
Assisted Schools”. NSP is for “New Schools Program”. EVS is for “Education Voucher Scheme”. 
PSSP is for “Public School Support Programme”. 
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Several papers have estimated the effects of subsidies and voucher programmes in 
Pakistan on test scores, generally finding positive effects on both enrolment and 
learning outcomes (Kim et al., 1999; Alderman et al., 2003; Barrera-Osorio et al., 
2013; Amjad & MacLeod, 2014; Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2015; Barrera-Osorio et 
al., 2017; Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, Ozyurt, & Singh, 2018). One descriptive study 
considers the “adopt-a-school” programme in Punjab and Sindh covering 1,500 
schools (Malik et al 2015). A full summary is presented in Table 3.2.  This is the 
first study to estimate the causal effect of the PSSP programme, which has 
transferred over ten percent of government primary schools in the province to 
private management in its first year.  
 
Table 3.2: Literature on Public-Private Partnerships in Pakistan 
Author Date Province PPP Type Outcome 
Type 
Outcome Study 
Type 
Alderman et 
al 
2003 Balochistan Subsidy Enrolment Positive RCT 
Amjad & 
Macleod 
2014 National 
Subsidy & 
Voucher 
Learning Positive OLS 
Andrabi et al  2018 Punjab Subsidy Learning Positive RCT 
Barrera-
Osorio  
et al 
2013 Sindh Subsidy Learning 
Positive 
(0.16 SD) 
RCT 
Barrera-
Osorio & 
Raju 
2015 Punjab Subsidy Enrolment Positive RD 
Kim et al  1999 Balochistan Subsidy Enrolment Positive RCT 
Malik et al  2015 
Punjab & 
Sindh 
Contract 
Schools 
Learning Positive PSM 
Note: This table presents a summary of all identified studies on PPPs education in Pakistan 
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The Public School Support Programme (PSSP) 
 
In December 2015 the Punjab government announced that it would transfer 
management of 5,000 failing government schools (12 percent of all primary 
schools) to private operators. The ‘Public School Support Programme’ (PSSP) 
began Phase 1 just four months later, at the start of the next school year in April 
2016. Phase 2 began after the summer break in August 2016, and Phase 3 at the 
start of the following school year in April 2017. So far, 4,276 schools with over 
500,000 students have been transferred. The Punjab Education Foundation 
(PEF) tendered schools competitively, with eligibility criteria laid out for two 
categories of bidders – organisations (existing school operators and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)), and individuals. Government received 
19,000 applications for the first phase of 1,000 schools. Organisations were 
prioritised over individuals in the bidding process. Organisations with experience 
running schools were prioritized further.  There are now around 2,600 schools 
contracted to organisations (each organisation has at least ten schools) and 1,700 
schools contracted to individuals. Organisations are paid 700 Pakistani Rupees 
per child per month, and individual operators 550 Rupees21. This is equal to less 
than half of government per pupil spending in public schools (1,507 Rupees per 
pupil per month)22. Students may enter Katchi grade (Kindergarten) at age four. 
Each PSSP school has a 2-year contract, with renewal subject to adequate 
performance on ‘Quality Assurance Tests’ (QATs). In the initial phase PSSP 
schools fell under the remit of PEF, but have since been transferred to a separate 
                                      
21 550 Rupees is the same amount provided to private schools through the Foundation Assisted 
Schools (FAS) programme (reaching 1.8 million students), and the Education Voucher Scheme 
(EVS) (reaching 0.5 million students). 
22 Institute of Social and Policy Sciences report on Public Financing of Education in Pakistan 
2010-11 to 2016-17. 
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authority, the Punjab Education Initiative Management Authority (PEIMA). 
PSSP schools are spread across the province, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Map of Treatment (Phase 1) and Comparison (Phase 3) Schools 
 
Note: This figure demonstrates that there is no geographical clustering of schools by phase. We 
refer here to Phase 1 schools as “treatment” and Phase 3 as “comparison”. 
 
PSSP schools are not allowed to charge fees, make profit, or select their students, 
though anecdotally some schools may have engaged in some selective admissions 
(M. Afridi, 2018). PSSP schools can hire their own teachers and head teachers at 
market salaries (teacher salaries in private schools are typically less than half of 
those in government schools). Incumbent government teachers were transferred to 
other government schools. Private school teachers in Pakistan are typically young 
unmarried women with less formal education, whereas public school teachers are 
more likely to be older men with more formal education. Despite the difference in 
Control (1903)
Treatment (922)
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teacher qualifications, private schools are typically able to elicit greater effort 
from their teachers, and achieve comparable or better results (Andrabi et al., 
2008). A small sample of PSSP schools reported in Afridi (2018) suggests that 
teachers in PSSP schools are similarly qualified to those in other PEF supported 
private schools. PSSP schools teach the regular curriculum, and their students sit 
both the standard Grade 5 exams administered to students in both public and 
private schools by the Punjab Examinations Commission (PEC), as well as the 
Quality Assurance Test (QAT) exams administered to PEF-partnering private 
schools for all grades. PSSP schools must meet minimum standards in the QAT 
for continued participation in the programme, and may be eligible for financial 
bonuses for good performance. The School Education Department (SED) 
maintains ownership of buildings and responsibility for maintenance. PSSP school 
operators are required to submit quarterly expenditure statements detailing how 
income from government was spent. Payments are made monthly to school bank 
accounts. For the first six months schools are due a fixed amount regardless of 
enrolment – after this period they are due a variable amount based on the 
number of enrolled students (regardless of grade). Schools continue to teach in 
the existing medium of instruction, using textbooks provided by the Schools 
Education Department (SED) or PEF. Students wear the same uniforms as those 
worn in government schools. 
 
Schools were eligible to be selected if they met any one of five criteria - being a) 
overcrowded, b) under-utilised, c) with low enrolment, d) low exam pass rates, or 
e) entirely non-functional. Overall 10,664 schools met at least one of these 
criteria, leaving a large number of schools that may still be selected into any 
future Phase 4. Executive District Officers (EDOs) were responsible for selecting 
which schools to recommend for transfer. The selection criteria are consistent 
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across the 3 phases, with one change being the expansion of the definition of poor 
learning outcomes from a 0% pass rate in Phase 1 to below 25% from Phase 2, as 
few schools met this criterion in Phase 1.  
 
 
Table 3.3: PSSP Selection Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Schools 
selected 
(Phase 1 – 
3) 
All 
Eligible 
Schools in 
Punjab 
% 
Selected 
1. Multi grade & 
over crowded 
1 teacher, needs more 
classrooms, & above 80 
students   
103 943 11 
2. Under utilised 
2 or more teachers & below 30 
students 
430 1,464 29 
3. Low 
enrolment 
Fewer than 21 students in 
Grade 1-5  
1,504 5,320 28 
4. Poor learning 
outcomes 
0% PEC passing rate (Phase 1 
handover) or Less than 25% 
passing rate (Phase 2 
handover) 
872 1,317 66 
5. Non-
functional & 
closed 
Non-operational  / Merged  520 1,620 32 
Total  3,429 10,664 32 
Note: Schools were eligible to be recommended for inclusion in the PSSP if they fulfilled at least 
one of the selection criteria. McKinsey (2017) reports aggregate numbers selected according to 
each criterion. Our data does not associate individual schools with specific criteria.  
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3.3 Methodology 
 
Our key challenge in estimating the causal effect of school conversion is finding 
an appropriate counterfactual. As schools were selected for PSSP based on low 
enrolment and exam scores, they are not comparable to non-PSSP schools. 
 
We use a standard difference-in-difference strategy similar to that used by 
Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Hull, & Pathak (2016) and Eyles et al. (2017) in the 
context of US Charter school and UK Academy converters. We compare the 
change in outcomes for early converting schools with the change in outcomes for 
later converters. We assign schools converted in Phase 1 as treatment schools, 
and schools selected later in Phase 3 as comparison schools. The change in 
outcomes is then presented for the one school year when Phase 1 treatment 
schools had already been converted and Phase 3 comparison schools had not yet. 
Both treatment and comparison schools were selected into the programme 
according to the same criteria. Whether schools were selected into Phase 1 or 
Phase 3 was essentially arbitrary, as the programme was launched just four 
months after being announced. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that there is no 
geographical clustering of Phase 1 and Phase 3 schools, which are evenly spread 
across the Province.  
 
We estimate the following standard difference-in-difference equation in which T is 
a binary indicator for treatment status, ‘Post’ is a binary indicator for pre or post 
status, 𝜸𝒊 are school fixed effects, δt are year fixed effects, and our main 
coefficient of interest is 𝜷𝟑 looking at the effect of the interaction between 
treatment and post.  
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  yit=α+β1Tit+β2Postit+β3TitPostit+γi+δt+εit              (2.1) 
 
For 𝜷𝟑 to be an unbiased estimator of the true causal effect, we need two 
assumptions. First, that there is no time-variant group-specific unobservables – 
something unobserved that is specific to treatment schools that also determines 
student outcomes. Second, we assume that T the effect of time on outcomes is the 
same for both groups. This second assumption is the parallel trends assumption. 
Whilst we cannot test whether trends would have been parallel in the absence of 
the treatment, we can test a corollary of the assumption – that pre-trends before 
treatment assignment should also be parallel. 
 
3.4 Data 
 
Enrolment 
 
We use data on enrolment from three sources; the Government Annual School 
Census, monthly monitoring data, and data collected from the Annual Status of 
Education Report (ASER). The timing of data collection across each source and 
the stages of the PSSP reform are shown in Table 3.5. 
 
The primary source is the annual Government of Punjab School Census data 
(also known as EMIS - Education Management Information System). Head 
teachers report in October each year23. The data includes student enrolment by 
                                      
23 For 2017 we use enrolment data from monthly independent monitors collected from schools. 
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grade, school facilities, staffing, and location. The main weakness of the EMIS 
data for our purpose is that the outcome variable of interest (enrolment) is self-
reported by schools. We address this by crosschecking the data against other 
sources. We compile EMIS data for all schools from 2012-13 to 2017-18.  
 
Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants (MEAs) from the Programme Monitoring 
and Implementation Unit (PMIU) of the School Education Department visit 
schools each month. Assistants observe student enrolment, teacher presence, and 
the availability of utilities. A team of 856 monitors covers 47,725 government 
schools (on average 56 schools each). Assistants enter data using a tablet-based 
mobile app, allowing for built-in validation checks. We only have data from this 
source for part of 2017, after the conversion of Phase schools, so we cannot use it 
for our main analysis, but can use this independently collected source of data as a 
robustness check on the self-reported EMIS data where there is overlap. 
Enrolment for PSSP schools reported by the independent monitors is on average 
1.8 students lower than that self-reported by head teachers through the EMIS. 
The correlation between the two measures is 0.89. 
 
The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) is a citizen-led survey of 
students and schools. The survey covers over 250,000 children each year, tested at 
their home rather than at school to capture those not enrolled. The survey also 
gathers basic data about the government and private schools that are available to 
children, including school enrolment. The survey is conducted between September 
and November each year. The ASER dataset is limited to a sample of 734 schools 
in Punjab (of 37,078 total primary schools). There are only 24 PSSP Phase 1 or 3 
schools in the ASER dataset. However the dataset does allow for the comparison 
of figures for the 734 Punjab schools that do appear in both datasets. Enrolment 
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for PSSP schools reported in ASER is slightly higher than enrolment reported in 
the EMIS, though this difference is not statistically significant. The correlation 
between the two measures is 0.69. 
 
Learning Data 
 
For learning we use three different sources of data, from the Punjab 
Examinations Commission (PEC), the PMIU Learning and Numeracy Drive 
(LND), and the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) Quality Assurance Tests 
(QAT).   
 
The primary source is the Punjab Examinations Commission (PEC) data. All 
students in both government and private schools are tested at Grade 5 and Grade 
8 if they want to progress to the next level of schooling. These exams are high 
stakes for the student but not for the school. Exams are sat in February each 
year. Students must be at least 8 years old to sit the Grade 5 exam. The exam is 
90 - 150 minutes long for each subject, with 34 items (questions). 30 items are 
multiple-choice focused on knowledge, and four are open-ended focused on 
comprehension. PEC reports average percentage marks (from 1 – 100) for all 
exam candidates from each school in five subjects; Urdu, Mathematics, English, 
Science, and Islamiat. We standardise test scores by subject and year. 
 
Second, we use Learning and Numeracy Drive (LND) collected on a monthly 
basis from all schools. School Monitoring Officers visit all public schools monthly 
and test a sample of five Grade 2 and five Grade 3 students using a tablet-based 
app. Each student is given seven randomly selected multiple choice question items 
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in Urdu, English, or Mathematics. The majority (83 percent) of schools are tested 
at least five times in the seven months for which we have data.  
 
Third, PEF collects test data from all schools under its jurisdiction as part of its 
accountability framework. All schools are private schools except for PSSP schools 
in its initial phases. At the primary school level, tests are conducted in two 
randomly selected classrooms. Students sit a two-hour exam covering four 
subjects; English, Urdu, Science, and Mathematics. Schools that fail two 
consecutive QATs lose their entitlement to public funds. For a school to pass, at 
least half of students must pass the exam. For students to pass they must get at 
least 40 percent of the available marks. In our data, we have the average pass 
rate for all students at each school. The majority of schools in the PSSP first 
phase are managed by non-governmental organisations. Of these schools, 43 
percent passed the QAT Table 3.4. PEF provides schools with model papers and 
past exam papers to enable them to prepare students for the exams. 
  
Table 3.4: QAT Pass Results for Phase 1 NGO Schools 
 
Schools 
Percentage of 
schools passing 
All Phase 1 NGO Schools 626  0.43  
Ghazali Education Trust 30  0.90  
Learning Zone 10  0.80  
National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) 100  0.60  
Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA) 30  0.53  
Akhuwat 100  0.41  
Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP) 70  0.41  
CARE Foundation 100  0.40  
The Citizens Foundation (TCF) 80  0.36  
Ghazali Society 45  0.24  
Developments in Literacy (DIL) 31  0.19  
Muslim Hands 30  0.13  
Note: Pass rates for NGO operators in Phase 1 are reported in 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1485071/57-ngo-run-public-schools-fail-pef-assessments/ 
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Phase 1 (Treatment) schools began operation at the start of the school year in 
April 2016. The primary outcome data we use comes from the following year 
EMIS collected in October 2016 (six months after conversion) and PEC exams 
from February 2017 (ten months after conversion). Phase 3 (Comparison) schools 
then began operations at the start of the school year in April 2017. We discard 
data on Phase 2 schools that began four months into the school year and so may 
have faced considerable disruption.  
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Table 3.5: Data and Programme Timing 
Month PSSP Programme 
Enrolment Data Learning Data 
EMIS MEA ASER PEC LND QAT 
Oct-15   2015-16  Y    
Nov     Y    
Dec         
Jan-16         
Feb      G5   
Mar         
Apr Phase 1 (Treatment)        
May         
Jun         
Jul         
Aug        
Sep     Y    
Oct   2016-17  Y    
Nov     Y    
Dec         
Jan-17    Y   G2-3  
Feb    Y  G5 G2-3  
Mar    Y   G2-3 P1 Endline 
Apr Phase 3 (Control)   Y   G2-3 P3 Baseline 
May   Y   G2-3  
Jun        
Jul        
Aug   Y   G2-3  
Sep   Y Y  G2-3  
Note: This table outlines the timing of the PSSP programme, and how this overlaps with the 
available data on enrolment and learning.  
 
Although our identification does not rest on baseline balance in covariates 
between schools, we nonetheless present baseline descriptive statistics for the 
groups of schools. Differences between treatment and comparison schools are 
statistically significant but small for prior enrolment, years in operation, number 
of classrooms, and classes. Differences are not statistically significant for the 
number of books. PSSP schools are all primary schools. PSSP schools are smaller 
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than average. Phase 1 schools had 77 students and Phase 3 schools 68 students, 
compared with 114 students for all other public primary schools.  
 
Table 3.6: Baseline Balance (2015-16)  
 
Treatment 
(Phase 1) 
Comparison 
(Phase 3) 
Non PSSP 
Primary 
Schools 
Diff 
(Phase 1 – 
Phase 3) 
P – Value 
N (Schools) 995 1,977 34,163 . . 
Enrolment (Students) 77 68 114 9 0.000 
Teachers 2.3 2.1 3.2 0.2 0.000 
PEC Pass Rate 0.65 0.64 .  0.38 
PEC Average Marks 53.8 53.2 . 0.6 0.27 
PEC Candidates 5.9 5.4 . 0.5 0.012 
Years in operation 37 35 39 2 0.000 
Classrooms 2.8 2.5 3.2 0.3 0.000 
Classes 5.9 5.6 5.8 0.3 0.000 
Note: This table presents characteristics of PSSP schools prior to conversion. We don’t have data 
for PEC exams for non-PSSP schools.  
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3.5 Results 
 
In the following analysis, we first focus on enrolment as an outcome before 
moving to learning outcomes. For each outcome, we first present graphs of the 
average outcomes over time. Second, average outcomes pre- and post- reform. 
Third, the same analysis in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
framework including comparisons for school and time fixed effects.  
 
Enrolment 
 
The first outcome considered is the total number of enrolled students, as reported 
by the head teacher through the EMIS system. We observe a parallel trend in 
enrolment for treatment and comparison schools between 2012 and 2015, with a 
break between 2015-16 and 2016-17 when treatment schools are treated and their 
enrolment rises. In the 2017-18 school year, enrolment continues to rise in 
treatment schools. Comparison schools are also treated in 2017-18, and their 
enrolment begins to increases in parallel with treatment schools. The visual 
inspection of the parallel trends is confirmed by statistical test, which shows that 
the interaction between treatment status and the year indicator is insignificant in 
the pre-treatment period.  
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Figure 3.4: Enrolment trends in treatment & comparison schools 
  
Note: The left panel presents trends in average student enrolment numbers for treatment (Phase 
1) schools and comparison (Phase 3) schools. The right panel presents estimated treatment effects 
by year (controlling for lagged enrolment). Data for 2012-2016 is self-reported by head teachers in 
annual school census carried out in October. Independent monitors collect data for 2017 from the 
school register in August. 
 
 
We next present average enrolment levels for the years immediately pre- and 
post- treatment. The difference in change in means across treatment and 
comparison is statistically significant. Enrolment in treatment schools increased 
by 58 students (60 percent) more than in comparison schools (Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7: Average (mean) enrolment 
Phase 
Mean 
Enrolment 
2015-16 
Mean 
Enrolment 
2016-17 
Difference 
P - 
Value 
Schools 
Comparison (Phase 3) 68 72 4  1,945 
Treatment (Phase 1) 77 139 62  938 
Difference 9 67 58 0.00  
Note: This table shows the simple differences in mean enrolment outcomes for comparison and 
treatment schools pre- and post- reform.  
 
We then estimate the effect of treatment in a regression framework, including all 
previous years of data, year fixed effects (column 1), school controls (column 2), 
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and school fixed effects (column 3). The coefficient is stable at 48 to 49 students 
across specifications (Table 3.8).24 In studies with a large number of time periods, 
serial correlation in both the outcome and the independent variable of interest 
may be a concern, biasing our standard errors. Following Bertrand et al. (2004) 
we address this concern by collapsing the data into a single pre- and post- reform 
period, finding qualitatively similar results.  
 
Looking at heterogeneity by school type, enrolment increases by more in single-
sex schools than in mixed schools. We find no difference in effect size on 
enrolment by other prior school characteristics, including the criteria by which 
they were selected into the programme, their initial size, or their age25. Schools 
contracted to an NGO increased their enrolment by less than those contracted to 
individuals. 
                                      
24 We report consistent estimates based on independently collected data (from a very small 
sample) in Table A3.2.  
25 Our data does not include which school was selected according to which criteria, and so we 
reconstruct an estimate for each school of which criteria they were selected according to, based on 
the definition in Table 3.3. A comparison with actual aggregate numbers for each criterion and 
numbers based on our reconstruction are shown in Table A3.1. 
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Table 3.8: Effect of Treatment on Enrolment 
 (1) (2) (3) Boys Girls Mixed 
       
Treatment x Post 48.607*** 48.611*** 48.366*** 56.334*** 53.468*** 45.509*** 
 (1.488) (1.499) (1.484) (3.645) (4.201) (1.764) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes     
       
Baseline 
Comparison Group 
Mean 
76.6 76.6 76.6 84.5 80.4 74.2 
N 17,099 16,701 17,099 3,316 2,071 11,478 
N (Schools) 2,884 2,794 2,884 555 346 1,921 
R-squared 0.207 0.313 0.335 0.385 0.344 0.323 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of students enrolled. Columns (1) – (3) show all 
schools, and (4) – (6) show boys, girls, and mixed schools, respectively. School controls include 
prior number of years in operation, number of classrooms and classes, and district fixed effects. 
Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Breaking down this change in enrolment by grade, we observe that the increase is 
concentrated in Katchi grade (Kindergarten) (40 students) and the early grades. 
The difference in Grade 5 is just one additional student in treatment over 
comparison schools.26 
                                      
26 We do not have data on student attendance, but unpublished analysis by McKinsey (2017) of 
MEA data suggests a slight decrease in the student attendance rate of Phase 1 schools after 
conversion. 
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Table 3.9: Effect on Enrolment by Grade    
 K 1-5 1 2 3 4 5 
        
Treatment x 
Post 
39.928*** 18.488*** 6.961*** 3.923*** 3.956*** 1.857*** 1.027*** 
 (1.254) (1.022) (0.439) (0.311) (0.259) (0.225) (0.203) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Baseline 
Comparison 
Group Mean 
26.4 40.9 12.3 9.8 7.4 6.5 4.9 
N 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 
N (Schools) 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 
R-squared 0.505 0.290 0.207 0.174 0.167 0.069 0.044 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the number of students in that grade. “K” 
stands for “Katchi” which is equivalent to Kindergarten. Coefficients on the treatment and post 
dummies are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Enrolment Spillovers 
 
Were newly enrolled children previously out of school, or enrolled elsewhere? 
While we find a large effect of treatment on enrolment at PSSP schools, an 
important policy question is whether total enrolment increased. Did PSSP schools 
attract students who would not otherwise have attended school at all, or who 
were already enrolled in other schools. The data presented so far on enrolment at 
the school level does not allow us to say where new students came from. That 
most of the new enrolment is in Katchi grade rather than higher grades does 
suggest that many new students were not yet in school. But we don't know how 
many of those would have otherwise enrolled elsewhere. Schools may also have 
more actively recruited younger children, as government holds schools 
accountable for QAT test results in grades two to five. 
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We perform three other tests. First, we focus only on those villages in which the 
PSSP school is the only public school. Enrolment in these schools is less likely to 
be affected by spillovers from other nearby schools. There are 23 union councils 
with only a treatment PSSP school, and 60 with only a comparison PSSP school. 
The estimated effect on enrolment in this sub-sample is 71 students – larger than 
in the full sample. 
 
Second, looking at enrolment at the closest neighbouring public school should 
directly capture any spillover27. We link all treatment and comparison schools to 
their nearest neighbouring school. The median nearest neighbour is within 0.5km 
of the school, and 75 percent of neighbours are within one kilometre. We then 
estimate the same difference-in-difference model as in the previous section, but 
replace the outcome as the enrolment level at the nearest neighbour rather than 
the treatment school itself. Results suggest that schools who’s nearest neighbour 
is a PSSP school also see an increase in enrolment. This is the opposite of the 
negative effect that we would expect if enrolment in treatment schools were 
driven by the recruitment of students from neighbouring schools. This result is 
robust to dropping neighbours further than one kilometre. As discussed below 
under mechanisms for the main effect, new PSSP school operators carried out 
community engagement in order to encourage parents to enrol their children. It is 
possible that this engagement led to positive spillovers for non-PSSP public 
schools also. We see no difference in the effect for small schools or for schools 
operated by NGOs rather than individuals.  
 
                                      
27  We do not have data on enrolment in private schools 
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Table 3.10: Effect of Neighbouring a Treatment School on Enrolment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All All K All Primary 
Neighbour Treated X Post -0.790 11.504*** 14.337*** 1.649 
 (7.878) (3.903) (3.368) (2.125) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
School FE  Yes   
     
Baseline Comparison 
Group Mean 
124.2 124.2 26.4 40.9 
N 8,956 8,956 824 824 
N (Schools) 2,589 2,589 414 414 
R-squared 0.015 0.119 0.234 0.132 
Note: The dependent variable is enrolment at the closest neighbouring school to each PSSP 
treatment school. “K” stands for “Katchi” which is equivalent to Kindergarten. Coefficients on the 
treatment and post dummies are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Third, we aggregate the data to the Union Council level. There are 6,646 union 
councils in Punjab. The median Union council has 5 schools. For each union 
council, we calculate total enrolment by year, and the proportion of all schools 
that were Phase 1 (treated) schools. We then report the same difference-in-
difference analysis. In this case the treatment variable is the share of schools in 
the council that were in Phase 1 (treated). Column (1) in Table 3.11 shows the 
effect for the full sample of moving from zero treated schools to all treated 
schools. This estimate is biased as we are no longer comparing to later converting 
schools but to all schools, and many union councils with no PSSP school at all. 
Adding union council fixed effects reverses the sign on the diff-in-diff coefficient. 
Finally, we restrict the sample in columns (3) and (4) to only those union 
councils in which there was at least one PSSP school. These estimates are 
consistent with and without union council fixed effects. 
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Table 3.11: Effect on Enrolment at Union Council Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Treatment X Post -22.273* 34.951*** 47.050*** 46.149*** 
 (12.041) (7.791) (10.465) (9.889) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Union Council FE  Yes  Yes 
     
Baseline Mean 255 255 162 162 
Treated share 0.017 0.017 0.161 0.161 
N 34,607 34,607 4,187 4,187 
N (Units) 6,645 6,645 707 707 
R-squared 0.020 0.072 0.027 0.075 
Note: The dependent variable is total enrolment in the district council. Treatment is defined as 
the share of schools in the union council with a Phase 1 treated PSSP school. Coefficients on the 
treatment and post dummies are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Mechanisms 
 
How and why do schools increase student enrolment? First, schools have a strong 
incentive to maximize enrolment as they are funded on a per student basis. 
Parents face no change in price that remains zero, so schools are forced to 
compete on quality (or at least indicators of quality that are visible to parents). 
One clearly visible indicator of quality is class sizes. We observe large increases in 
the number of teachers (from two to five), reducing pupil-teacher ratios from 35 
to 25, despite the concurrent increase in student enrolment. This increase in 
teachers is enabled by the substantially lower market rate for salaries in private 
schools - 1,407 rupees ($12) per month, compared to 7,671 rupees ($66) in 
government schools (Bau & Das, 2017). Analysis of MEA data by (McKinsey, 
2017) found no change in teacher presence rates for PSSP Phase 1 and 2 schools 
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after conversion, and no change in school facilities (boundary walls, toilets, 
electricity, drinking water). 
 
Table 3.12: Effect of Treatment on Class Size (Pupil-Teacher Ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pupil teacher ratio Teachers 
Treatment x Post -9.323*** -8.816*** -9.324*** 3.068*** 3.062*** 3.087*** 
 (1.052) (1.066) (1.063) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes   Yes  
School FE   Yes   Yes 
       
Baseline 
Comparison Group  
Mean 
34.5 34.5 34.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 
N 5,664 5,491 5,664 5,679 5,504 5,679 
N (Schools) 2,879 2,791 2,879 2,880 2,791 2,880 
R-squared 0.013 0.135 0.038 0.478 0.534 0.551 
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the pupil-teacher ratio, and in columns 4-6 is the 
number of teachers. School controls include prior number of years in operation, number of 
classrooms and classes, and district fixed effects. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies 
are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Second, there are some reports that some school operators passed on some of their 
subsidy directly to parents. One provider the Punjab Rural Support Programme 
is reported to have offered parents 500 rupees a month per child.28 Other 
providers conducted weekly parent teacher meetings and events to involve 
parents in the school, or involved the local mosque leader to generate community 
buy-in. Third, some schools switched from being girl-only schools to being mixed, 
increasing their market size (M. Afridi, 2018). 
                                      
28 https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153868 
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Student performance 
 
How do schools perform on learning? We estimate the same difference-in-
difference model as before, now with the province-wide standardised Grade 5 
exam test score data as the outcome. The outcome is the school-level average 
score. We first look at the number of students taking the exam. The number of 
students taking the exam in treatment schools increased from 5.8 in 2015-16 to 
7.9 in 2016-17, an increase of two students. This difference falls to 1.5 students 
when controlling for school fixed effects (Table 3.13). 
 
Table 3.13: Effect of Treatment on Grade 5 Exam Candidates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment x Post 1.960*** 1.717*** 1.513*** 
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.193) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes  
School FE   Yes 
    
Baseline Comparison 
Group Mean 
5.5 5.5 5.5 
N 7,592 7,472 7,592 
N (Schools) 2,780 2,726 2,780 
R-squared 0.023 0.214 0.071 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of Grade 5 examination candidates. School controls 
include prior number of years in operation, number of classrooms and classes, and district fixed 
effects. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The prior trend in the average number of exam candidates is close to parallel in 
treatment and comparison schools (Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5: Trends in Grade 5 exam candidates  
    
Note: The left panel presents trends in the average number of Grade 5 exam candidates for 
treatment (Phase 1) schools and comparison (Phase 3) schools. The right panel presents estimated 
treatment effects by year. 
 
This increase in students taking the Grade 5 exam makes it difficult to interpret 
the effect on average test scores. We are unable to distinguish between a 
treatment effect on pre-enrolled students and a compositional effect from the 
entry of new candidates. The increase in new exam takers might come from 
marginal students with lower than average expected results.  
 
The graph of average exam scores shows a slight relative decline for treatment 
schools after conversion. But prior trends are not parallel, casting doubt on the 
required parallel trends assumption for us to interpret these effects as causal. 
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Figure 3.6: Trends in Grade 5 Scores 
  
Note: The left panel presents trends in average student exam scores for treatment (Phase 1) 
schools and comparison (Phase 3 schools). The right panel shows estimated treatment effects by 
year. All data is at the school-level from the Punjab Examinations Commission. 
 
 
In the OLS regression framework we estimate a small negative effect on average 
test scores (-0.08 school-level standard deviations) and on Maths and English, (-
0.1 school-level standard deviations). There is no effect on Urdu, Science, or Islam 
scores.29  
                                      
29 Note that the interpretation of effect sizes in terms of school average test score standard 
deviations is different to the interpretation of effect sizes in terms of individual student standard 
deviations. The variation in school average test scores is roughly half of the variation in student 
test scores, so to compare this effect size with estimates from impact evaluations using individual 
student data, one should divide this estimate by half. 
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Table 3.14: Effect on Grade 5 Test Scores, by Subject 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.082** -0.027 -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.032 -0.046 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Baseline Comparison 
Group Mean 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 
N (Schools) 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 
R-squared 0.328 0.095 0.409 0.231 0.278 0.174 
The dependent variable is standardised to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year and 
subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Ideally we would address the conflation of treatment and compositional effects by 
limiting our analysis to only students who would have taken the test without 
treatment. Unfortunately with our data we are unable to identify these students. 
What we can identify is the change in the total number of candidates entered by 
the school. We estimate heterogeneous effects by splitting the sample into schools 
that had more candidates, schools that had the same number, and schools that 
had fewer candidates than before. Here we see an important difference. Only 
schools that entered more candidates than before saw a decrease in test scores. 
Other schools saw no change in test scores. The number of candidates entered is 
endogenous to test scores and so we cannot be sure that these effects are causal, 
but the data is consistent with any negative effect being driven by a 
compositional effect rather than a treatment effect. 
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Table 3.15: Effect of Treatment on Test Scores, by School Type 
Panel A: Schools with fewer candidates after treatment 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post 0.018 0.080 -0.035 -0.060 0.131* -0.025 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.066) (0.074) (0.075) (0.068) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 
N (Schools) 895 895 895 895 895 895 
R-squared 0.314 0.095 0.410 0.210 0.262 0.169 
Panel B: Schools with the same number of candidates after treatment 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.002 0.060 -0.060 0.042 -0.035 -0.004 
 (0.092) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.113) (0.086) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 
N (Schools) 425 425 425 425 425 425 
R-squared 0.378 0.129 0.450 0.263 0.295 0.219 
Panel C: Schools with more candidates after treatment     
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.158*** -0.107** -0.154*** -0.163*** -0.130** -0.064 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) (0.043) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 
N (Schools) 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
R-squared 0.327 0.090 0.401 0.239 0.287 0.168 
Note: The dependent variable is standardised to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year 
and subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
 
We can also use the monthly Literacy and Numeracy Drive (LND) data for 2017 
to look at the change in performance for Phase 3 schools following conversion. 
Here we don't have data from before conversion of Phase 1 schools, so don't have 
the same natural treatment and comparison group as before. We do though have 
detailed student data on a monthly basis for all schools (this is a panel of schools 
and not students, who are randomly sampled in each round). Instead we show a 
comparison of Phase 3 schools before and after conversion with trends in Phase 1 
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schools (already converted) and all other non-PSSP schools.  Here there is a large 
fall in test scores at Phase 3 schools following conversion. Again we are unable to 
distinguish between the treatment effect on pre-existing students and the 
compositional effect of the new students. Here the speed of the drop in test scores 
(in a single month) also seems to be more consistent with a compositional effect 
than a treatment effect. If teaching at converted schools were worse, we would 
expect to see a gradual divergence in test scores over time rather than a sudden 
drop. The LND data also tests different grades (2 and 3) to the earlier PEC data 
(grade 5). That the fall in test scores is larger in grade 2/3 than grade 5 is again 
consistent with a compositional effect, as the increase in enrolment was larger in 
lower grades. Enrolment increased by four students in grades 2 and 3, and by just 
one student in grade 5. 
 
Figure 3.7: Trends in Grade 2-3 Test Scores (2017) 
  
Note: The left panel presents trends in average student test scores for PSSP and all schools. Phase 
1 schools were converted in the prior year, and Phase 3 schools in April. The right panel presents 
estimated treatment effects by year, in this case reversing the two groups and treating the Phase 
3 schools (newly converting) as the treatment group and Phase 1 schools (already converted) as 
the comparison group.  
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The visual inspection of (Figure 3.7) is supported by the simple difference in 
average test scores (Table 3.16) and the OLS estimate with subject, grade, and 
school fixed effects (Table 3.17), which both suggest -0.11 percentage points lower 
test scores.  
 
 
Table 3.16: Pre- and Post- Grade 2-3 Test Scores 
 
Jan-Mar 2017 Apr-Sep 2017 Difference 
Phase 1 0.74 0.67 -0.07 
Phase 3 0.81 0.63 -0.18 
Other 0.83 0.78 -0.05 
Phase 3 - Phase 1 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 
Note: This table shows the simple differences in mean enrolment outcomes for comparison and 
treatment schools pre- and post- reform.  
 
 
Table 3.17: Effect of Treatment on Grade 2-3 Test Scores 
 (1) (2) 
   
Treatment x Post -0.107*** -0.112*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Subject FE Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes 
School Controls Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes 
   
N 70,967 70,967 
N (Schools) 2,801 2,801 
R-squared 0.103 0.102 
Note: The dependent variable is standardised to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year 
and subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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In contrast to findings so far, results from Quality Assurance Tests (which are 
high stakes for schools) suggest improvement in treatment schools. Here we only 
have tests from a single point in time, but can compare results for Phase 1 
schools at the end of their first year with Phase 3 schools at the start of their first 
year. Data is for the pass rate at the school. The average pass rate after 
treatment was 55 percent, compared with 41 percent before treatment. For 
schools to pass the QAT test, at least 50 percent of students must pass the test. 
425 Phase 1 schools (43 percent) failed the QAT test at the end of their first 
year. We see some clear evidence of manipulation by schools. 31 schools report a 
pass rate of exactly 50 percent of students (the threshold required for the school 
to pass). Zero schools report a pass rate of 49 percent of students. 
 
Figure 3.8: Quality Assurance Tests (QAT) (2017) 
  
Note: This figure presents the frequency of schools reporting each student pass rate on the QAT 
test, with baseline pass rates on the left and endline pass rates on the right. 
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in other grades as well. As numbers were so low to begin with, this means that 23 
to 31 percent of students taking tests after the reform were new students. If we 
assume that the true treatment effect on the original students was zero, we can 
calculate how much worse the performance must have been amongst new students 
for the overall estimated average effect to be the size that it was. This calculation 
is laid out in Table 3.18 below. The implied performance of new students ranges 
from -0.35 standard deviations worse in Grade 5 to -0.45 in Grade 2. 
 
 
Table 3.18: Minimum required bias from compositional effect consistent with a 
null treatment effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Increase in 
candidates 
Total new 
candidates 
New 
Students as 
% of Total 
Students 
Overall test 
score 
reduction 
(SD) 
Minimum 
required 
negative effect of 
new students 
(SD) 
Grade 5 1.5 6.5 0.23 -0.08 -0.35 
Grade 3 4 13 0.31 -0.112 -0.36 
Grade 2 4 16 0.25 -0.112 -0.45 
Note: Column 4 shows the observed reduction in test scores for each grade. Column 5 calculates 
what the required relative average performance of the new students would have to be if they were 
entirely responsible for the overall reduction observed in column 4, if the true treatment effect on 
existing students were to be zero.  
 
There could also of course have been selection in the other direction. Some new 
students may have come from private schools, and be more advantaged than the 
average student. We aren’t able to place a bound on this possible positive 
selection. 
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3.5.1 Results for Different School Operators 
 
We have data from six of the eleven NGO operators from Phase 1 that allow us 
to identify their schools in the data. Here we present results disaggregated by 
school operator for enrolment and pupil-teacher ratios. We omit analysis of 
learning given the uncertainty about the overall results. Each of the six operators 
has a positive effect on enrolment, though a smaller positive effect than other 
(anonymous) operators. All of the operators also increase the number of teachers 
hired. Two operators increase their teachers by more than average – TCF (5 
teachers) and CARE (4 teachers). This leads to large reductions in pupil-teacher 
ratios in these schools by around 20 students (Table 3.19). Overall the NGOs 
have lower enrolment growth than other schools but a similar increase in 
teachers, leading to lower pupil-teacher ratios.  
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Table 3.19: Treatment Effects by Operator 
 Enrolment Enrolment Teachers Teachers PTR PTR 
       
CARE 31.375***  3.950***  -19.619***  
 (3.091)  (0.202)  (2.230)  
DIL 13.815***  1.207***  -8.728***  
 (3.617)  (0.215)  (1.964)  
ITA 35.602***  2.865***  -16.357***  
 (4.294)  (0.295)  (4.565)  
Muslim 
Hands 
45.932***  1.431***  -1.286  
 (5.606)  (0.292)  (4.467)  
NRSP 20.281***  1.166***  -9.140***  
 (2.861)  (0.127)  (3.178)  
TCF 38.354***  4.909***  -18.938***  
 (3.549)  (0.216)  (2.603)  
Other PSSP 59.439***  3.238***  -6.348***  
 (1.949)  (0.114)  (1.391)  
All NGOs  29.606***  2.812***  -13.687*** 
  (1.658)  (0.123)  (1.419) 
Other PSSP  59.439***  3.238***  -6.348*** 
  (1.948)  (0.114)  (1.390) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Baseline 
Comparison 
Group 
Mean 
76.2 76.2 2.1 2.1 34.2 34.2 
N 17,068 17,068 5,548 5,548 5,529 5,529 
N (Schools) 2,876 2,876 2,829 2,829 2,829 2,829 
R-squared 0.346 0.345 0.610 0.554 0.051 0.043 
Note: Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted. CARE is the “CARE 
Foundation”, DIL is “Developments in Literacy”, ITA is “Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi”, NRSP is the 
“National Rural Support Programme”, TCF is “The Citizen’s Foundation”.   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have estimated the effect of the fastest ever programme of 
contracting out government schools to private management. We find a large 
increase in enrolment and a modest decline in test scores. We are unable to say 
with full confidence how much of the increase in enrolment came from students 
who were not already in another school, or whether the observed decline in test 
scores is due to a negative treatment effect or a purely compositional effect. We 
also do not necessarily expect to see impacts on test scores in the relatively short 
time period for which we have data.  
 
We are also unable to determine whether the effect on school enrolment is 
inherent to private management, or simply a function of a system of school 
financing in which schools are reimbursed on a per student basis.  
 
Future research could usefully identify and track students who were enrolled in 
schools before transition, in order to get a clearer estimate of the actual treatment 
effect on learning outcomes.  
 
Given the size of the non-state school market in Pakistan, it seems likely that 
there could be sufficient operator supply response if the government chose to 
further scale-up the programme.  
 
PSSP schools reduce annual per pupil spending by government from 1,507 rupees 
to 550 rupees. Whilst this is a large margin, the total saving for 400,000 students 
is only 382 million rupees ($3.6m USD), or around 0.14 percent of the total 
provincial education budget (296 billion rupees or $2.5bn USD). This small 
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potential saving has not actually been realized as existing teachers from PSSP 
schools were moved to other government schools rather than laid off. Hence an 
important question is how effectively those teachers are used in other schools and 
whether they fill gaps or duplicate existing effort. A further caveat is whether the 
payment of market salaries in PSSP schools is sustainable, or whether teachers 
may manage to lobby to receive regular government teacher salaries, as contract 
teaching assistants in Kenya (Sandefur, 2013) and India30 have done. 
 
                                      
30 https://scroll.in/article/846589/in-uttar-pradeshs-botched-effort-at-regularising-contract-
teachers-a-lesson-for-other-states 
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Appendix A3.1: Tables 
Table A3.1: PSSP Selection Criteria 
 Actual Estimated 
Criteria 
Schools 
selected Phase 
1 – 3 
(Percent) 
Eligible 
Schools 
Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
Phase 
1 - 3 
1. Multi 
grade & 
over 
crowded 
103 943 25 26 52 103 
2. Under 
utilised 
430 1,464 24 211 154 389 
3. Low 
enrolment 
1,504 5,320 73 527 455 1,055 
4. Poor 
learning 
outcomes 
872 1,317  397 1,285 1,682 
5. Non-
functional 
& closed 
520 1,620 15 22  37 
Total 3,429 10,664 137 1,183 1,946 3,266 
Note: Schools were eligible to be recommended for inclusion in the PSSP if they fulfilled at least 
one of the selection criteria. Actual aggregate numbers selected according to each criterion are 
reported in columns 1 and 2. Our data does not associate individual schools with specific criteria, 
so we estimate school’s selection criteria based on their enrolment, teachers, and test scores in 
2015-16. Our estimate performs well for criteria 1 to 3, but over-estimates schools selected on 
criteria 4 and underestimates schools selected on criteria 5. Criteria 4 (poor learning outcomes) 
was 0% for Phase 1 and then increased to 25% for Phase 2 due to low numbers of schools with a 
0% pass rate.  
 
  
157 
Table A3.2: Effect of Treatment on Enrolment 
 EMIS Data ASER Data 
 (1) (2) 
   
Treatment x Post 48.297*** 37.971 
 (1.484) (29.289) 
Year FE Yes  
   
Baseline Comparison Group 
Mean 
  
N 17,494 39 
N (Schools) 2,972 36 
R-squared 0.337 0.064 
Note: The dependent variable in each column is total student enrolment. EMIS data is self-
reported by head teachers. This is the main analysis reported in Table 3.8. ASER data is 
collected by an independent NGO from individual class registers. This data is available for only a 
small sample and so the results are not statistically significant, but the coefficient is similar to 
that using self-reported data.  
Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure A3.1: Trends in Grade 5 Test Scores by Subject 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis is comprised of three essays on the economics of education in 
developing countries, focused on the empirical micro-econometric analysis of 
public financing of schools operated by non-state actors.  
 
Chapter One evaluates a policy on publicly subsidised private secondary schools 
in Uganda. Student value-added is higher in these schools than in government 
schools. The chapter explores the role of the quality of school management as a 
mediating factor in the performance differential, finding that private schools are 
on average no better managed than government schools, with the exception of 
those managed by an international charity. Future research could usefully address 
the question of how to improve school management at scale, and the role that 
performance management systems and school inspections can play. 
 
Chapter Two evaluates a five-year private school voucher lottery programme in 
Delhi. This lottery was designed as a test of India’s national Right to Education 
Act Section 12(1)(c), which reserves 25 percent of places at private schools 
nationwide for students from “economically weaker sections”, with funding 
coming from government. Students who won the lottery and attended low-cost 
private schools performed slightly worse in Hindi and no different in Maths and 
English, or on various non-cognitive skills. Given our results consistent with 
imperfect information, a plausible role for government could be providing the 
public good of better information about school quality, as has shown to be 
effective at improving private school quality in the US (Hastings and Weinstein, 
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2008), India (Afridi et al., 2018) and Pakistan (Andrabi et al., 2017), or focusing 
on private school market failures in other areas (Andrabi et al., 2015). 
 
Chapter Three evaluates a large-scale contracting out of public schools to private 
management in Punjab, Pakistan. Using a difference-in-difference framework, I 
estimate that failing government schools that are contracted out to private 
operators dramatically increase their enrolment, but that the effect on student 
learning is ambiguous. Future research could usefully identify and track students 
who were enrolled in schools before transition, in order to get a clearer estimate of 
the actual treatment effect on learning outcomes.  
 
Overall these three studies highlight the variability in forms of public financing 
for independently operated schools, and the variability in quality. In all three 
policies, financing for non-state schools costs significantly less than equivalent 
spending in government schools. The chapters contribute to the literatures on 
public private partnerships in education, on the role of school management in 
determining student performance, and on school choice. 
 
What is clear is that private schools are no panacea, but that they may play a 
role in providing more access to schooling, in some cases of somewhat better 
quality, and typically at lower overall cost. An important open question remains 
how best to regulate and oversee the quality of both private and public schools. 
One strength of public-private partnerships is that they demand that some kind 
of explicit contract is written down between government and school operators. In 
principle there is always some kind of implicit contract between government and 
schools whether they are private or public, but too rarely are priorities made 
explicit. 
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